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Abstract The consolidation of neoliberal capitalism over the past decade has been intense, 
as has the articulation of critical and creative responses to it. One of the most remarkable is 
the turn towards forms of political resistance that seek liberation from the logics of state and 
capital while – or through – simultaneously creating alternative, radically democratic modes 
of existence. Many of these draw on anarchistic and autonomist traditions of critical theory 
which assert the possibility of prefiguring alternative political projects as well as critiquing 
existing ones, thus appearing to transcend what Herbert Marcuse described as a ‘vicious 
circle’ of liberation (1964, 1967). We have thus seen a proliferation of work on problems of 
prefigurative politics, autonomy, co-operation and self-valorisation; significantly, there is 
renewed attention to pedagogy in critical theory and as a political practice. However, there is 
still little attention to the affective and social labour that this type of prefigurative theory and 
practice requires, or to the systemic critique of the conditions of possibility for it to constitute 
a challenge to neoliberalism. My concern is that these lacunae can lead to misinterpretations 
of the meaning of radical democracy and of its possibilities and limitations as a challenge to 
the logics of neoliberal capitalism and other forms of dehumanising power. In this paper, I 
draw on work with British-based cultural workers who are active in radical-democratic 
projects to illustrate how bringing practical work into conversation with critical theories of 
political subjectivity, on the one hand, and theories of affective pedagogy and politics, on the 
other, can contribute to strengthening both theories and practices of radical democracy. 
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Are we all radical democrats now? 
 
In the autumn of 2011, Judith Butler wrote a short essay about whether the most recent 
global financial crisis had caused the new waves of social unrest which had resurged in 
Greece and across the world. In it, she argued that ‘the call on the streets is precisely not to 
“fix” this fiscal crisis, but to insist that the dismantling of neo-liberalism is imperative for the 
renewal of radical democracy’ (Butler 2011a). I would like to use this statement to reflect on 
what radical democracy is, and what it might mean to renew or cultivate it in our everyday 
lives. However, I would also like to ask whether the statement should be turned on its head. 
Rather than supposing that radically democratic ways of thinking, feeling, doing and being 
are consequences of the dismantling of neoliberalism, I propose that we regard them as 
prefigurative epistemologies and practices which contribute to the dismantling of 
neoliberalism and other antidemocratic forms and logics of social life.  
 
However, as both the dismantling of capitalist relations and the creation of radically 
democratic societies are utopian projects that require high levels of social participation, I 
would also like to reflect on the ease with which notions of radicality now circulate in critical 
theoretical work.1 To be sure, many of the things associated with the term ‘radical 
democracy’ – states of genuine political and intellectual autonomy, intensive forms of social 
collectivity or affinity, egalitarian and horizontal forms of economic organisation, 
encouragement of creative experimentation, deep levels of receptivity to otherness and to 
that which is new, and acceptance of the ‘infinitely demanding’ ethical character of both 
critique and democracy itself – offer critical tools for challenging the deadening 
determinations of neoliberal rationality. As Nikolas Kompridis has argued,  
‘[t]hese taxing and exhausting times require cultural practices that can reopen the future 
and unclose the past, cultural practices that can regenerate hope and confidence in the 
face of conditions that threaten to make even their regeneration meaningless. 
Philosophy, critical theory, critique, whatever name one wants to use, have been and 
can still be possibility-disclosing practices [...] practices that can facilitate the renewal of 
utopian energies, the regeneration of confidence and hope’ (2006: 277). 
 
This argument is not new, but belongs to a tradition of thinking that radical democracy has a 
prominent place in the critical philosophy of transformative experience, as well as in 
traditions of socially engaged art, critical education and political activism. We have many 
eloquent philosophical statements on what radical democracy is and could be, as well as on 
the nature of transformative experience, the affective and moral foundations of critique, and 
the ontology and epistemology of otherness (Kompridis 2006: 2011). However, many of 
these philosophical treatments were not produced in response to concrete problems of 
radical-democratic practice, and some do not speak to practice at all. Similarly, in traditions 
of critical pedagogy and social movement education there are rich bodies of knowledge 
about attempts to democratise knowledge and learning, and insight into the complexity of 
                                                          
1
 Here, I use the term ‘project’ in the way of Herbert Marcuse, to mean the undetermined realisation of 
a particular social formation. As he argues, ‘the way in which a society organizes the life of its 
members involves an initial choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the 
inherited level of the material and intellectual culture. The choice itself results from the play of the 
dominant interests. It anticipates specific modes of transforming and utilizing man and nature and 
rejects other modes. It is one “project” of realization among others’ (Marcuse 1964). 
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situations where people embrace transformative encounters with themselves, others, power, 
limits and borders, and new ways of being (Boler 1999, Dewey 1938, Freire 2000, hooks 
1994, Rancière 2010, Sandlin et al. 2011). But again, while the relationship between 
knowledge, power and liberation is well theorised in such work, there is little philosophical 
explanation of how and why such projects work in practice.  
These lines of thinking can be brought into more productive conversation with one another. 
For example, a recent essay by Nikolas Kompridis (2011) on the relationship between 
critique and democracy may be read as a challenge to socially engaged artists and 
educators. Kompridis argues that in order to engage in practices of critique, people must first 
be receptive to change – and that this receptivity can neither be taken for granted as pre-
existing nor ‘taught’ in a didactic way.2 But if democratic life demands that we ‘work on 
ourselves’ by ‘becoming receptive and answering the normative demand to think and act 
differently from how we have been thinking and acting’, where is this work meant to take 
place, and of what does it consist concretely? If conditions for receptivity, democratic 
deliberation and critique do not already obtain, what ‘possibility-enabling practices’ might be 
conductive to their emergence?  
Such questions resonate with the problems encountered by artists and educators working in 
‘frontline communities’, as community and cultural activist work is sometimes described. 
Many speak of the exhausting efforts that are required to engage in long-term struggles to 
facilitate such ambiguous ‘possibility-enabling practices’ in conditions of struggle that 
sometimes appear almost hopelessly foreclosed. Bringing critical-theoretical, critical-
pedagogical and critical-practical perspectives together can offer deeper insight into why we 
are rarely but can always potentially be open to critical thinking and practice. It offers insight 
into the conditions for deep forms of democratic life, into the material and subjective 
conditions of possibility for these conditions to obtain, and into how people are working to 
cultivate them through education, the arts and through political action in everyday life.  
This work also has the potential to resolve a paradox of power that Herbert Marcuse referred 
to as a ‘vicious circle’ of liberation. Marcuse argued that in order for any radical 
transformation of society to occur, the ‘rupture with the self-propelling conservative 
continuum of needs must precede the revolution which is to usher in a free society, but such 
rupture itself can be envisaged only in a revolution’ (Marcuse 1969; see also 1964: 250). In 
other words, Marcuse was concerned that  
‘…transcendence beyond the established conditions (of thought and action) 
presupposes transcendence within these conditions. This negative freedom – i.e., 
freedom from the oppressive and ideological power of given facts – is the a priori of 
the historical dialectic; it is the element of choice and decision in and against 
historical determination. None of the given alternatives is by itself determinate 
negation unless and until it is consciously seized in order to break the power of 
                                                          
2
 According to Kompridis, receptivity is non-instrumental because it is not about satisfying felt needs; 
rather, ‘we do not yet know where we will arrive, for we do not yet “know” the nature of the need that 
impels us or where it will lead us’ (2006: 204). Receptivity thus demands persistence, just as effective 
critique demands ‘suffering’ the world, without special privilege for being ‘its’ critic, and with no 
verification for truth or self other than that which is not yet in existence (Kompridis 2006: 258, 272). 
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intolerable conditions and attain the more rational, more logical conditions rendered 
possible by the prevailing ones. In any case, the rationality and logic invoked in the 
movement of thought and action is that of the given conditions to be transcended’ 
(1964).3 
 
Marcuse found it difficult to envisage how processes of becoming-other could be 
revolutionary prior to revolution, or in how there could be cracks in the dominant rationalities 
which shape our imagination of both present and future. Radical democracy, particularly in 
its prefigurative forms, ostensibly allows us to imagine such possibilities. 
Yet what is often missing from this argument is an acknowledgement that radical democracy 
is also an exhausting form of politics in its own right. It is an intense, oppositional logic of 
practice which has ambivalent qualities of being simultaneously exhilarating and exhausting, 
comforting and terrifying, liberating and paralysing, and joyous and painful (Trowell 2012). 
As one young educational activist said, ‘I don’t think transformation is only liberatory or 
exhilarating. It can be quite painful and a fraught process.’ Many argue that you have to be a 
special sort of person to engage in such activity.4 This experience is intensified when the 
values, vocabularies and practices of such projects are rendered unintelligible within existing 
political frameworks. They are not only unfamiliar, but often deliberately uncomfortable and 
thus easily perceived as threats to the existing order of things.5 The project of radical 
democracy therefore has as much potential to close down possibilities for transformation as 
it does to open them up.6 The assumption that it is inherently transformative, or that it 
emerges spontaneously by force of circumstance, distracts us from asking questions about 
what actually makes it not only possible, but a desirable way of living together.  
In this paper, I therefore do not ask either how we can dismantle neoliberalism or all become 
radical democrats. My questions are more modest, and emerge from the basic demand on 
critical theorists to understand the character, limits and potentialities of ‘possibility-enabling 
practices’. I ask what work socially engaged educators, artists and activists undertake – or 
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 Elsewhere, Marcuse (1967) described this circle as ‘brutal’ in its impossibility, as ‘the transition from 
voluntary servitude (as it exists to a great extent in the affluent society) to freedom presupposes the 
abolition of the institutions and mechanism of repression. And the abolition of the institutions and 
mechanisms of repression already presupposes liberation from servitude, prevalence of the need for 
liberation’. 
 
4
 This is a familiar formulation, which can be seen in the Frankfurt School studies on ‘the authoritarian 
personality’ (1950), Theodor Adorno’s essays on education after the Holocaust (Adorno 1967; Adorno 
and Becker 1999; Amsler 2011), and Herbert Marcuse’s notion of ‘the new human being’. Of 
particular interest is Douglas Kellner’s essay on Marcuse’s quest to define a ‘radical subject’ with a 
‘sensibility that would revolt against the existing society and attempt to create a new one’ (2002). 
Kellner argues that, even prior to the poststructuralist turn and separately from discourses on radical 
democracy, ‘Marcuse posits a subjectivity that is libidinal and embodied, evolving and developing, 
while striving for happiness, gratification, and harmony. Such subjectivity is always in process, is 
never fixed or static, and is thus a creation and goal to be achieved, and is not posited as an absolute 
metaphysical entity. Marcusean subjectivity is thus corporeal, gendered, oppositional, and struggles 
against domination, repression, and oppression, and for freedom and happiness.’ 
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 As Kompridis argues, the unfamiliar and uncontrollable qualities of ‘the new’ make it an ambiguous 
phenomenon. On one hand, they ‘become reasons for why we should mistrust the new, or they can 
become the intellectual and affective conditions necessary for its emergence’ (2011: 257). 
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indeed, undergo – so that radically democratic principles and practices become viable 
possibilities in everyday life? What material, social, cognitive, semantic, and affective 
conditions are conductive to the materialisation of such possibilities once imagined? Finally, 
what role, if any, can pedagogy and thought play in these processes?  
Before examining these questions, I should define ‘radical democracy’. For whom is it 
meaningful and important? Where are languages of radical democracy spoken, and where 
are they unfamiliar, rejected or unintelligible? What distinguishes it from other, less ‘radical’ 
notions of politics circulating in Anglo-European societies, and with which does it resonate? 
What, if anything, lends the notion of radical democracy plausibility as a robust 
counterweight to neoliberal forms of power in this historical moment? And does resisting the 
capitalist reordering of social life mean that we are all radical democrats now?  
What is radical democracy? 
The contemporary notion of radical democracy – which is better understood as an 
assemblage of liberatory theories and practices rather than a unitary system – refers in the 
broadest sense to practices of autonomous, collective and egalitarian self-rule that aim to 
continually intensify collective human flourishing, partly by creating spaces for its expansion 
and partly by refusing to accept all institutional, material, cognitive, symbolic or affective 
limitations which are inevitably encountered in this pursuit. Although somewhat formulaic, 
Jason Vick’s inventory of principles that characterise deep forms of democracy offers a 
useful framework, which includes ‘a strongly egalitarian sensibility, an emphasis on citizen 
participation, a concern for individual development, an expansive notion of the political, a 
critique of existing democratic institutions and practices, and a critique of capitalism as it 
currently operates’ (2012: 1).7 What distinguishes radical democracy from shallower 
participatory forms, however, is a cultivated receptivity to ‘agonism and concern for 
difference’, a belief that real politics is an ‘often sporadic and rare’ activity, and an attention 
to ‘the surplus time, resources and localism that is necessary to partake in politics’ (Vick 
2012: 1).  
Jacques Rancière’s work clarifies why Vick argues that democratic politics is a rare 
phenomenon. Rancière suggests that democracy is what happens at the limits of 
institutionalised and habituated forms of social life. He finds it in the ‘often short-lived 
moment when those who are excluded from the political order or included in it in a 
subordinate way, stand up and speak for themselves’, and who in doing so disclose even the 
most sacred institutions as enclosures of social possibility (2010: 9). Rancière therefore 
locates the most authentic moments of democracy in relations of dissensus – not in the 
deceptively stable, seamless stream of social life moving along, but in the disorienting, 
uncomfortable and decentring moments in which new bodies, languages, experiences and 
needs demand to be included in political systems, institutions, forms of knowledge and 
modes of existence that cannot survive their accommodation without being changed. These 
encounters therefore have the potential to ‘effectuat[e] a change in the distribution of the 
sensible’ of the system on the whole (2010: 147).8 The intensities of the openings-up and 
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 See Vick’s footnote on discussion of difference between deliberative, agonistic and liberal 
democracy. 
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 The extension of radical democracy to knowledge is perhaps best expressed in the post-structuralist 
attention to the ‘world-making powers’ of sounds, grammars, syntax and semantics; the insistence 
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closings-down that ensue in such situations are, according to Rancière, the only meaningful 
measures of democracy itself.9 
The desire for such politics is not new. It can be seen in Emma Goldman’s injunction that the 
ends of any revolution must be visible in its means (Goldman 1924 in Bertalan 2011: 221); in 
John Dewey’s dream of educating for a ‘creative democracy’ that might constitute ‘a freer 
and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute’ (Dewey 1939); 
and in Albert Camus’ argument that the only way to ensure international peace was to 
abandon hope in extant political institutions and ‘reconsider everything from the ground up, 
so as to shape a living society inside a dying society’ (Camus 1946). Goldman, Dewey and 
Camus did not identify themselves as ‘radical democrats’. But their refusals to conflate the 
institutionalised and procedural regimes of democratic politics with lived experiences of 
democratic freedom mark them as exemplars of this sensibility, as does their insistence that 
the radical critique – and where necessary the dismantling – of such institutions is a 
necessary condition of democracy itself.  
Vick locates contemporary interest in such conceptions of democracy in the revolutionary-
utopian energies of the 1960s and 1970s, but traces its origins to the crisis of the state-
centred and procedural models of liberal democracy that dominated social theory and 
organised politics for much of the twentieth century (2012: 4). Interest in radical-democratic 
theory and practice was dampened during the 1980s by the consolidation of neoliberal 
capitalism, the ‘structural adjustments’ imposed on the global south by the IMF, the 
managerial revolution in liberal-democratic public institutions, and the disarticulation of 
organised Left politics in the face of new conservative blocs. Some argue that democratic 
energies were further asphyxiated by the victories of the new social movements themselves, 
which were thought to have opened space for a rapprochement between capitalism, 
autonomy and creativity (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006; Fraser 2009). The publication of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics in 1985 revivified academic debates about radical democracy with its 
critique of both orthodox Marxism and liberal democracy and its articulation of an alternative 
theory of agonistic democracy. At the same time, counter-hegemonic struggles were 
articulating through the work of anti-apartheid activists in South Africa, democracy activists in 
the Soviet bloc, autonomous workers’ cooperatives in Western Europe, the Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation in Mexico, alternative economies in Western Europe, feminist political 
collectives of care across Latin America, and anti-authoritarian educators in schools, 
universities and informal educational projects around the world. During the 1990s, anti-
capitalist, alter-globalisation and direct action movements such as Reclaim the Streets, 
ACTup and the World Social Forum shifted the terrain even further as these struggles began 
to articulate into a ‘movement of movements’ (Graeber 2002). Ana Dinerstein and Séverine 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that the fixing of meaning through these forms is an exercise of power; and therefore that the 
problematisation of representation must be a permanent, vigilant and inexhaustible element of any 
projects for progressive politics. For Michel Foucault, this meant ‘to bring it about that [people] “no 
longer know what to do”, so that the acts, gestures, discourses which had seemed to go without 
saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous’. Judith Butler likewise has argued that ‘identity 
categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalising...repressive 
structures or the rallying points for a liberatory consciousness’, and that she ‘would like to have it 
permanently unclear what the sign signifies’. 
  
9
 For a critique of Ranciére’s theory of the distribution of sensibility, see Kompridis (2011). 
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Deneulin have aptly given the name ‘Hope Movements’ to a range of social movements 
which ‘do not attempt to articulate or engage in alternative development initiatives, as these 
ultimately reproduce the logic of the state, but rather ‘are engaged in an autonomous search 
for a new way of life which is more conducive to creating an environment where human 
beings can live in dignity’ (2012: 589). Over the course of a decade, these movements 
united and fragmented in a dynamic meta-movement which attracted pockets of public 
curiosity and, while they never constituted a counter-hegemonic bloc, they unsettled a 
longstanding faith in the sustainability of liberal democratic institutions, ethics and 
subjectivities (Day 2011).  
However, while alternatives to both capitalism and liberal democracy are clearly 
demonstrated within these diverse struggles, the radical democratic imaginary fell even 
farther off the radar of everyday life as public discourses on politics, education and culture 
consolidated around concepts of representative democracy, multicultural ‘tolerance’, national 
security and neo-liberal individualism. It was not until financial capitalism began to spiral into 
a new cycle of violent crises during the early 2000s that the idea of radical democracy 
became salient in popular politics and media, particularly as increasingly defiant protests 
against government ‘austerity’ intensified and more violent forms of state control were 
legitimised in response. As Isham Christie has argued, ‘as socio-economic conditions 
continue to deteriorate and dissatisfaction in representatives grows, the response we are 
seeing is not cynicism or apathy. It is the beginning of an awakening toward radical social 
change’, which recognises that ‘a liberal response to appease unrestrained capitalism and 
people’s interest is impossible’ (2012). With the major occupations of the Wisconsin State 
House and New York’s Zuccotti Park, the public squares of Athens and Madrid and St. 
Paul’s Cathedral in London behind us, conversations about direct action, do-it-yourself 
organising, temporary autonomous zones and prefigurative politics are, if certainly not 
common sense, at least not taboo.10 It is no longer regarded as completely ludicrous to 
speak of revolution or to argue that deep democracy is a viable and desirable organising 
principle of for social life.11  
Time for a politics of possibility 
These critical-experimental modalities of resistance are challenging and exciting not simply 
because they are uncommon, but because they have interrupted a widespread ‘crisis of 
hope’ and been enacted in environments where oppositional politics were presumed to be 
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 I am deliberately excluding reference to the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts and revolutions in this context, for 
while there have been clear resonances between these movements for social change I believe their 
particularities warrant the refusal to conflate them. 
 
11
 It may or may not be helpful to refer to Occupy as a ‘movement’. Jason Adams (2011) defines it as 
a ‘divergent assemblage of individual and collective singularities’ that will ‘either increasingly resonate 
and compose a more formidable counter-temporality, or progressively decompose, as occurred with 
the Sixties generation following Reagan and the Seattle generation following Bush’. Similarly, Saul 
Newman has defined radical democracy as a ‘series of mobilizations and practices of emancipation, 
rather than as a specific set of institutional arrangements’ (Newman 2011: 65). And, according to 
Vick, Wolin understands radical democracy as an “ephemeral phenomenon rather than a settled 
system’, a multiplicity of “small politics, small projects, small business” in which those who have “no 
means of redress” act and speak their grievances’ (Wolin in Vick 2012: 25). 
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more or less dead.12 As Simon Critchley (2012b) recently argued, ‘Occupy is the becoming-
conscious of a deep disaffection with normal politics, particularly among the young’. It 
captures the imagination because it affects, evoking a ‘sense of aliveness’ and affirming our 
‘changeability’ (Massumi 2002: 15).13 The idea of radical democracy is popular not because 
it is a pragmatic politics but because it produces affective resources of hope which offer 
foundations for a new politics of possibility.  
The ‘politics of possibility’ J. K. Gibson-Graham’s name for a prefigurative type of politics 
which offers a ‘vision of transformation as a continual struggle to change subjects, places 
and conditions of life under inherited circumstances of difficulty and uncertainty’ (Gibson-
Graham 2006: xxvii). It is also the name for a political imaginary, which Gibson–Graham 
argue has been ‘radically altering the established spatiotemporal frame of progressive 
politics, reconfiguring the position and role of the subject, [and] shifting the grounds for 
assessing the efficacy of political movements and initiatives’ in recent years (Gibson-
Graham 2006: xix).14 It is different from democratic politics-as-usual in that, like many of the 
‘newest social movements’ which are anarchistic in nature, it does not presume that direct 
struggle against dominant groups, institutions or ideologies is an effective strategy of 
resistance against hegemonic forms of power, or that it is a path towards autonomous and 
creative alternatives.  
 
A politics of possibility therefore works through processes of ‘disengagement and 
reconstruction rather than by reform or revolution; with the end of creating not a new 
knowable totality (counter-hegemony), but of enabling experiments and the emergence of 
new forms of subjectivity’ (Day 2011: 108, 113). This model of democracy valorises 
dissensus, infinite openness to difference, deep criticality, the decentring and ‘tearing away’ 
of certainties, continual transformation and permanent revolution. It is prefigurative because 
it seeks to create new worlds that embody these principles by working within and using the 
resources of the existing one, with particular attention to the micro-politics of space, time, 
language, the body and the emotions which frame all of the above (Gibson-Graham 2006: 
xxvii).  
 
While there is not scope to explore the full meaning of prefigurative politics here, it is worth 
noting that common definitions include four dimensions:  
 
 
                                                          
12
 The notions of ‘critical’ and ‘experimental’ attitude are both from Foucault. For Foucault’s 
explanation of the first, see ‘What is critique?’ (Foucault 2007). For a discussion of the second, see 
Tully (1999). 
 
13
 Although David Graeber suggests that the Occupy movement ‘caught on’ because ‘most Americans 
are far more willing to embrace radical ideas than anyone in the established media is willing to admit. 
The basic message - that the American political order is absolutely and irredeemably corrupt, that 
both parties have been bought and sold by the wealthiest 1 per cent of the population, and that if we 
are to live in any sort of genuinely democratic society, we're going to have to start from scratch -
 clearly struck a profound chord in the American psyche’ (2011b). 
 
14
 For an alternative reading of prefigurative politics based on the theorisations and practices within 
non-violent anarchist movements, see Epstein (2002). 
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- A grounded critique of capitalism and a conception of its alternatives  
 
Politics here means commitment to social, political and economic justice in both the 
concrete struggles of everyday life and issues of global scale; always-already here and 
now, rather than elsewhere in the future following education or revolution (Fielding and 
Moss 2011). Democracy understood in this way values ‘prefigurative practice’ (Fielding 
and Moss 2011: Gibson–Graham 2006). As such, it is understood as an historical 
project, the ongoing construction of and struggle to have the right to construct an ethical 
way of life and/or a state of being, rather than a system of institutions or an 
institutionalised response to them (Fielding and Moss 2011: 42; Lummis 1996: 22, 112). 
The politics of possibility is thus a practical expression of an ethos of critical 
experimentation, which shifts ‘critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into 
a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression’ (Foucault 1984: 45).15 
For all of these reasons, the project of radical democracy is inherently, necessarily and 
militantly anti-capitalist. 
 
- An anti-deterministic philosophy of human nature and the knowing, acting and feeling 
subject 
  
This view of progressive politics is premised upon a radical and generous faith in human 
potentiality and the ‘insistent affirmation of possibility’ (Dewey 1939, 1916; Fielding and 
Moss 2011: 82). It is based upon an assumption that the self, our relationships, 
knowledges and histories are necessarily emergent and undetermined (Dewey 1937, 
1938, 1939; Fielding and Moss 2011: 161; Freire 2000; Lummis 1996: 42). As group 
dynamics are just as contingent as individual subjectivity, we must also leave open 
possibilities for ‘positional restlessness’ and for people to ‘defy’ familiar and scripted 
roles in exchange for trying out something new (Fielding and Moss 2011: 154). 
 
From here, outcomes of political struggles are never seen as simple matters of failure or 
success, but rather moments in ongoing processes. As human experience ‘can have no 
end until experience itself comes to an end, then the task of democracy is to forever 
strive for a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all 
contribute’ (Dewey 1939). Radical democracy is therefore not simply an unfinished 
project, but an unfinishable project. Recognising the ubiquity of power in human 
relationships, ‘we can never allow ourselves to think that we are “done”, that we have 
identified all the sites, structures and processes of oppression “out there” and, most 
crucially, “in here”, inside our own individual and group identities’ (Day 2005). Visions of 
‘transformation as a continual struggle to change subjects, places and conditions of life 
under inherited circumstances of difficulty and uncertainty’ (Gibson–Graham 2006: xxvii), 
of ‘the instituting of a dispute over the distribution of the sensible’ (Rancière 2010: 37), of 
the will to ‘continual transformation’ (Nietzsche), the ‘state of permanent creation’ 
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 In Richard Day’s terms, it signals a shifting from the ‘politics of demand’ to something more like a 
‘politics of the act’. This means a turn away from modalities of resistance that wait for power to either 
come to see the reason of its opponents or to dissolve itself, towards practices that favour ‘inventing a 
response which precludes the necessity of the demand and thereby breaks out of the loop of the 
endless perpetuation of desire for emancipation’ within the existing system (Day 2011: 108). 
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(Deleuze), the ‘state of perpetual transition’ (Anzaldua) and the ‘state of eternal change’ 
(Goldman in Bartalan 2011) are all expressions of this spirit (Bartalan 2011). 
 
- Critical theories of knowledge production, learning and encounter 
 
If we presume that ‘unfinished’ subjects are engaged in projects to expand their 
collective possibilities and diminish, resist or transcend their limitations, it is important to 
have a theory of knowledge which is itself undetermined, unpredictable, unquantifiable 
and wild, and which embraces intellectual and social experimentation. The critical-
experimental attitude is therefore central to all theories of radical democracy (Dewey 
1938, 1939). However, in order to maintain an ethos of experimentalism that is loving 
rather than violent, it is also necessary that this epistemology be receptive to critique, on 
the one hand, and facilitative of encountering difference, otherness and ‘the new’ in 
open-hearted, open-minded and open-ended ways, on the other. Radical democracy is 
grounded in an epistemology that is militantly humble and humbly experimental.  
 
- Methodologies for living everyday life, resisting power and transforming social reality 
 
None of the above practices can be entered into as an individualistic matter. A 
fundamental condition of a politics of possibility is therefore the building of deep and 
durable social relationships which are based on mutual trust, aid and solidarity. This is 
difficult to do through institutional procedures, and on the contrary requires a dedicated 
ethics of care and attentiveness to others (Gibson–Graham 2006; Lummis 1996: 88); as 
well as an ethics of care for the self (e.g. ‘revolutionary self-cultivation’; see Gibson–
Graham 2006: xxxv). 
 
The promise of prefigurative politics is that it opens possibilities for ‘being the change you 
want to see in the world’ – or, more precisely, to practice attempting to be the change you 
want to see (Lehr 2012). It is precisely this possibility that people describe as inspiring: the 
thrill of the new; the expansion of transformative, revolutionary human creativity into the 
space of the political itself. The time and space of utopia are simultaneously contracted and 
expanded here: contracted, in that alternative futures become either present-in-practice or 
within imaginable reach; expanded, in that the horizons of possibility are therefore opened 
into infinity. If nothing else can be said for certain about such experiences, they are often 
exhilaratingly joyous – or even experienced, as Gavin Grindon argued (with reference to a 
flying anarchist), ‘mythic moments of potent affect’ (2007: 94). Many people who participate 
in radical democratic experiments for any length of time speak affectionately about their 
experiences of individual autonomy; new forms of non-competitive, non-instrumentalist and 
cooperative relationships with others; of belonging and being accepted; of the novel 
redistribution of time and space; of the thrill of self-governance; of feeling free from the 
constraints of dominating concepts, habits, relationships, vocabularies, institutions and path 
dependencies; and of coming to voice through collective caring and mutual aid.  
Mission impossible? 
 
But this hope is fragile. As Critchley points out, such prefigurative practice ‘requires 
subjective invention, imagination and endurance, not to mention tenacity and cunning’ and 
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demands a recognition that the education of new subjectivities is often pursued through 
prosaic and ‘largely unthrilling work’. As one activist recently wrote, 
 
‘The trap of the old world is hard to wriggle out of… and the escape is a learning 
process. Humans learn by doing. When we were little children, we emulated the adult 
world in our pretend play, joyfully doing the serious work of creativity and cognitive 
development. Let’s reverse that process. Let’s “play real”, emulating the world we 
want, until it grows and grows and becomes more real than the dead old world. This 
kind of ‘play’, as those who are already so deeply committed to Occupy and social 
change and activism already know, is damned hard work. We have to resist, first, the 
cultural values so ingrained on our psyches—things like competition, and distrust of 
strangers. We have to confront our own privilege, and the ways in which we are 
oppressed, so that we can be ready to be open to the ways that those privileges and 
oppressions intersect with the people we will be working with. We have to really listen 
to one another, be ready for the long hard work of real dialogue, ready to value 
disagreements as opportunities for new solutions. We must be ready to accept that 
some of us are angry, or sad, or tired; and are going to be that way for a long time. 
We must be there to listen, to offer care and to offer alternatives for support outside 
the dominant system. We have to fight the anger and sadness and weariness by 
making joy, with play; with art; with creativity; with action. With values that have 
nothing to do with buying and selling and labor-for- pay’ (Lehr 2012). 
 
Who other than the most committed – and the most privileged and powerful – activists could 
embrace and sustain such a politics? Even for those who are deeply committed to practicing 
such politics in everyday life, it is not an easy mode of existence, as ‘there are substantial 
emotional costs in the very act of taking a resistive stance on an issue, particularly when one 
is opposing the dominant beliefs of society’ (Brown and Pickerill 2009: 152). Jim, an artist–
educator who has been active in a democratic collective for more than two decades, 
suggests that such projects exercise a ‘weak muscle’ in a society that spends so much 
energy teaching people how to be individualistic rather than collaborative. He says: 
 
‘I think that people can get tired of the experience of constant self-management; you 
know, of trying to be flat, trying to negotiate everything with each other all the time. 
That ain’t easy, and I think somebody will feel – actually, I don’t need to do that, I 
want to just be in a hierarchy; give me a job and then I can get on with other things I 
want to do. […] I can see why they would feel that.’   
 
Such feelings can be intensified for people in particularly precarious positions who have 
demanding responsibilities caring for others, suffer from psychological and emotional pain, 
live in ‘front-line communities’ or must simply struggle for economic or physical survival. As 
one activist observed, it is ironic that the most popular projects in radical democracy are 
often ‘slow-moving beasts’ because ‘people don’t have the money, people are dealing with 
injustice on a daily level’ (Dan 2012). While living in a world of contracting possibilities is 
painful, working to expand the horizons of freedom can be difficult as well. For many people, 
therefore, the ‘politics of possibility’ simply does not appear possible at all – and it is often 
least possible for those who are imagined as its primary subjects. And while it is important to 
engage in a ‘semantic struggle to uncover and transform the meanings unavoidably shaping 
one’s identity and self-understanding’, it is also necessary to explore the affective politics of 
that such practice demands (Kompridis 2006: 73), and to realise that these must be 
collective projects.  
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It is not coincidental that one of the most influential theories of radical democracy – ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ – shares a root with the word ‘agony’. Although this evokes a sense of struggling 
through an ordeal with excruciating slowness, it refers more obliquely to an athletic 
competition that is ‘oriented not merely toward victory or defeat, but emphasises the 
importance of struggle itself’ and within which, therefore, a mutual respect for the existence 
and efforts of one’s opponents is implied. ‘Disagreement, conflict and struggle’, undertaken 
as mutually constitutive processes within an atmosphere of recognition, are therefore all 
central elements of agonistic politics (Chambers 2001). But this runs against the grain of 
popular understandings of democracy as indexed not only to a good life of equity, 
egalitarianism and autonomy, but to consensus, pleasure and conviviality as well. 
Democracy is meant to be the system that makes life less of a struggle; it is not supposed to 
hurt or be scary. But within the framework of an agonistic politics, this pleasurable imaginary 
of democratic life neglects at its peril the deep mechanisms of power – material, discursive, 
affective, social – that work despite, within and above all through all the procedural methods 
and forms of governance that are often intended to eradicate them. 
 
If taken seriously, the demands of radical democracy are thus simultaneously emancipatory 
and demanding. Simon Critchley has argued that they are in fact infinitely demanding, once 
we decide that living politically necessitates a ‘continual questioning from below of any 
attempt to impose order from above’ – and, although he does not say so, of any attempt to 
impose order from within and amongst ourselves (2007: 13, 40). It is infinite because the 
ethical demand to radicalise democratic relations with others and with the world cannot be 
fulfilled: we can never fully ‘know’ the other, never plumb the depths of consciousness or 
communicative meaning, never permanently short-circuit the circulation of power, never 
delineate the rhizomatic proliferation of possibilities and blockages, and never be excused 
from attending to the demands of others that divide us from ourselves. Critchley asks: ‘how 
can the extremity of the ethical picture [he] has described be borne without crushing the 
ethical subject? How can I respond to the infinite responsibility to the other without 
extinguishing myself as a subject?’ (2007: 69) Megan Boler puts the question in a different 
way: how can we encourage people to take up oppositional positions when they are ‘deeply 
invested in the dominant cultural values that these values have defined their sense of 
identity and to question these values feels emotionally like an annihilation of self’? (2004: 
119) And in Kompridis’s (2011) simpler terms: is it fair to ask people to work on themselves 
to make democracy work? 
 
Given the intense demands on the subject and on communities, how might radical 
democratic politics become desirable and emancipatory for all? While critical theories of 
radical democracy are inspiring, they often skirt serious treatment of the affective labour that 
it requires, and make few references to cultural work that really does create possibilities for 
such ways of thinking, acting and being to flourish and become viable. If new modes of 
political engagement are to be oriented towards ‘enabling experiments and the emergence 
of new forms of subjectivity’, we need to understand more than we do about the 
subjectivities, relationships, spaces, epistemologies, knowledges, affects and languages that 
are conducive to this project.  
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Seeking the elusive subjects of radical democracy 
 
The demands to be ready to resist, confront, listen, to be radically open or receptive to 
others and otherness, to be intellectually and emotionally reflexive are, in a sense, demands 
that critical theory has always made. The quest for conditions favouring the creation of 
critical and revolutionary subjects has preoccupied, and continues to preoccupy, writers in 
the Frankfurt School, anarchist, poststructuralist and feminist traditions of critical theory. This 
is perhaps exemplified by Marcuse’s ‘life-long search for a revolutionary subjectivity, for a 
sensibility that would revolt against the existing society and attempt to create a new one’ 
(Kellner 2002).  
 
As Kompridis argues, ‘receptivity [to change] is a condition for the possibility of critique’ 
(2011). This is simply another way of stating a fundamental problem within critical theory: 
can a critical theory of society ever be intelligible or legitimate in situations where there is no 
‘pre-theoretical resource for emancipation’ (Honneth 2007: 64); or, must we want or need to 
be critical before it is possible for us to be so, and are there any cultural practices that 
expand this space of possibility? For example, it has been argued that in order to ‘give the 
standards of critique an objective foothold in pre-theoretical praxis’, learning must respond 
to, rather than cultivate or produce, a desire for freedom that is presumed to exist pre-
politically in a ‘non-pathological’ state (Honneth 2007: 35 and 66). Throughout the critical-
theoretical tradition, the absence of the will to critique, the lack of the desire to struggle 
against limitations and to transcend existing circumstances, has been treated as a 
‘pathology’ created by the alienating and exploitative forces of capitalism, and by the 
dehumanising forces of authoritarian forms of state and social power.  Ernst Bloch, for 
example, insisted that ‘expectation, hope [and] intention towards possibility that has still not 
become…is not only a basic feature of human consciousness, but, concretely and correctly 
grasped, a basic determination within objective reality as a whole’ (Bloch 1991: 7); Paulo 
Freire that ‘the absence of hope is not the “normal” way to be human, [but] a distortion’ 
(Freire 1998: 69).16  
 
This deficit view of the human subject sets up a Herculean task of rehumanising people who 
have been divested of a natural will to critique and transcend their existing limitations. The 
implication of it is that really significant changes are therefore only made possible through 
crisis and diremption; in moments that rupture the ‘vicious circle’, and in a ‘breakdown of the 
interpretive scheme, the framework of intelligibility through which an individual had hitherto 
made sense of herself’ (Kompridis 2006: 64). It is argued that a critical consciousness of 
such moments of crisis create an intensified engagement with space and time in which we 
become compelled to reflect critically on how we reproduce, reject or transform the cultural 
practices that shape our world. In this reading, the transformative potential of crisis emerges 
from experiences of being ‘decentred’ in ways we neither choose nor control; outcomes are 
unpredictable, spontaneous and surprising. Feeling out of place, uncomfortable, 
unrecognisable, regarded as a threat to sacred normalities—or as Friedrich Nietzsche once 
wrote, the ‘bad conscience’ of one’s own time and society (cited in Kompridis, 2006: 5) – can 
provoke a state of heightened reflexivity in which we realize that our bodies, truths and ways 
of being do not fit the contours of a dominant reality and the reality could be otherwise 
(Ahmed 2004: 152).  
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The experience of crisis is thus regarded as a moment in which objective possibility is made 
subjectively possible, ‘when the “not yet” impresses upon us in the present, such that we 
must act, politically, to make it our future’ (Ahmed 2004: 184). What initiates such a crisis is 
‘a breakdown of the interpretive scheme, the framework of intelligibility through which an 
individual had hitherto made sense of herself. In such a crisis we experience that very sense 
of obscurity, the threat of incoherence, that prompts the fear that we are unable to 
comprehend and thereby formulate the demands to which we feel ourselves vaguely subject’ 
(Kompridis 2006: 64). Crisis occupies a central role in the history of critical thought and 
politics primarily because it is regarded as an intellectually and affectively motivating force 
(Kompridis 2006; Stahler 2008).  
This somewhat mechanistic theory of the linkages between critique, hope and social 
transformation is philosophically persuasive, but its translation into life is problematic. The 
social and affective foundations of this model of critique are situated and embodied, and 
distributed unequally throughout society in the usual ways. John Holloway, for example, 
suggests that anyone has the potential to become a critical theorist whenever we have the 
‘almost unbearable’ realisation that we cannot fit into the world; that we are ‘others’ living ‘in 
the wrong place, in the wrong sort of society’ (2008: 14). And, as Lorraine Hansberry argues, 
‘the thing that makes you exceptional, if you are at all, is inevitably that which must also 
make you lonely’ (1969, cited in Hill Collins 1991: 268).  
 
But such questions of affectivity and care, which are central to radical democracy and the 
dismantling of capitalist relations and logics, are not only marginalised within critical theory 
but often regarded as irrelevant to, or produced by, ‘real’ politics and political forces. The 
dominant model of the ‘crisis thinker’ still remains an ideal-type subject: an unattached, 
dissident intellectual; implicitly masculine, elite and professionally intellectual, for whom it is 
possible and justifiable – or even desirable or necessary – to live in contradiction to 
everything and everyone, and to make his own existential suffering into an object or a virtue 
for conceptual analysis. The problem with this account of ‘crisis thinking’ is that it conflates 
breaking through with breaking down – a distinction that critical cultural workers are much 
quicker to make. As David, an art educator reflected, ‘at times when you get that sense that 
somebody’s really had a breakthrough, or somebody’s really been moved by something you 
do, that’s the greatest, I mean that’s an extraordinary experience to have’. But, he continued, 
this often incurs a ‘cost of doing the work on the person who’s performing or teaching’. In 
order to experience ruptures as moments of possibility rather than merely as threats to 
existence, a person must be able to distance herself from the dominant sources of meaning 
and recognition, and to survive doing so within the possibilities and constraints of her 
concrete social conditions. According to Kompridis, it is by cultivating this sensibility and 
these capabilities that she will be able to embrace a wider range of practices that ‘facilitate 
the enlargement of meaning and possibility’, which in their turn should expand the availability 
of confidence and hope (ibid. 136), which in turn enable the ‘injection of new beginnings in 
public’, which is what ultimately makes transformative action possible (ibid.). However, she 
must have the social, affective and material resources to live ‘in contradiction to [her] time’, 
and to live with the dissonance this is likely to create both internally and in existing social 
relationships (Kompridis 2006: 5, 267). 
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These references to agony, unbearable modes of existence, and loneliness alert us to the 
possibility that the ‘pathologies’ which critical theorists have struggled so long against – the 
fear of freedom in particular – are not necessarily pathological at all. The fear of the new, the 
uncertain, the uncomfortable and the unfamiliar are not only explicable; moreover, ‘the 
desire to order chaos through simplified schemas, to ward off the felt dangers of ambiguity, 
seems perhaps more “human” a characteristic than any other’ (Boler 1999: 176).17 As John 
Dewey argued, ‘the live creature demands order in his living but he also demands novelty.’ 
However, ‘the difficult becomes objectionable only when instead of challenging energy it 
overwhelms and blocks it’ (Dewey 1932: 173). Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work illustrates 
beautifully how the destabilisation of equilibrium between that which we can consciously 
apprehend and make sense of (our ‘mental’ awareness of the world) and the preconscious 
experiences that frame and orient our experiences even though we cannot make sense of 
them (our ‘vital’ awareness’) produces an acute ‘awareness of our contingency’ that can be 
not only intellectually disorienting but sometimes even physically disruptive – an experience 
that manifests as ‘pathological’ – as well (in Addison 2011: 368). Intense emotions of the sort 
that radical democracy not only accommodates but demands can mobilise people or 
paralyse them; destabilise or maintain the status quo (Wilkinson 2009).  
 
There is a thus need within critical cultural and political projects to prioritise the theorisation 
of the intellectual, affective, relational and ethical labour that is necessary (but never 
sufficient) for subjective and collective transformation.18 Despite the ubiquity of ‘feelings of 
despair or personal fragility’ as a result of engaging in critical cultural activities, for example, 
the affective politics of critique are seldom regarded as serious political or cultural work (ibid. 
31) and, at times, are systematically denied or repressed (Brown and Pickerill 2009; Muray 
2012; Wilkinson 2009: 39).19 As one ecological justice activist remarked, 
  
‘[I am working with] people who have lost everything and have suffered immensely 
and you have a responsibility to these people. You know, I think all of that builds a 
kind of very, very strong pressure, and navigating around these areas is really 
                                                          
17
 This is perhaps what Adorno was attempting to argue in his comments on the improbability of 
educating ‘empathy’ or ‘love’. For him, ‘coldness’ (or an inability to empathise with others beyond 
one’s own self interest’ was as intrinsic a part of human nature as altruism within post-war German 
society. ‘If coldness were not a fundamental trait of anthropology’, he argued, ‘if people were not 
profoundly indifferent toward whatever happens to everyone else except for a few to whom they are 
closely bound and, if possible, by tangible interests, then Auschwitz would not have been possible, 
people would not have accepted it’. He added that ‘warmth among people, which everyone longs for, 
has never been present at all, except during short periods and in very small groups’ (1967: 8). This 
was important for Adorno because he believed that ‘if anything can help against coldness as the 
condition for disaster, then it is the insight into the conditions that determine it and the attempt to 
combat those conditions, initially in the domain of the individual’ (1967: 9).  
 
18
 Such work is necessary because it shapes the conditions of possibility in which things can happen; 
it is not sufficient because human beings cannot engineer or manipulate the total conditions of 
possibility for things to happen, and indeed can control very few of them once factors such as non-
conscious; unconscious; constellation; power; histories of place; the subjectivity, agency and needs of 
others; and chance are taken into consideration.  
 
19
 A contrast to this is the centrality of politica afectiva or affective politics in Latin America, which is a 
new form of politics that ‘establishes a new territory of spatiality…that generated a certain kind of new 
interpersonal relationship’, and of an ‘openness that is sustainable’ (Martin K. from Asamblea 
Colegiales, cited in Brown and Pickerill 2009: 32). 
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complicated. I’ve never really talked about these things in a ‘public’ way. […] I will talk 
about the issues, I will talk about the scenes, if you like, but, I won’t really talk about 
the personal effect it has on people who do that work. And, I don’t think we’re really 
educated, or brought up to talk in that way. […] I did once raise it, only once, in 
public. […] I remember at [a] conference saying, ‘why do we never seem able to talk 
about … the effect it has when we do this work? […] A lot of people came up and 
said, ‘thank you so much for saying that, because, people, especially men, don’t 
often say that’. [We] don’t connect up the different aspects.’ 
 
Until these forms of immaterial labour and experience are acknowledged as serious politics, 
it is unlikely that they will be sustainable or that radical democracy will become a viable 
alternative to neoliberal capitalism or a force in its dismantling. Spaces for the cultivation of 
liveable radical democratic subjectivities, relationships and practices must be created if 
neoliberalism or any other hegemonic social form is to be challenged or dismantled. And I 
suggest that the creation and expansion of such spaces is best understood as pedagogical 
work.20 
Pedagogy, prefiguration, radical democracy 
Democracy can be understood as a pedagogical activity if politics itself is understood as a 
process of learning and discovery. Indeed, we may understand all forms of political 
rationality as pedagogical. Neoliberalism itself is a ‘constructive project’ that does not 
presume all social life is or can be organised along market principles, including that which 
had previously been in non-economic domains, but aggressively constructs institutions, 
policies and human beings that can then become persuaded or forced to organise it in this 
way (Brown 2005; Giroux 2002). For Kompridis, the question facing critical theorists today is 
therefore how we can 
 
‘grasp as learning…those accomplishments through which we acquire new tongues 
with which to say what cannot be said and new ears with which to hear that which 
cannot be heard, accomplishments through which we overcome epistemological 
crises, and partial, one-sided interpretations of ourselves and others and 
accomplishments through which we are able to “go on” learning from our interaction 
with one another and our interaction with the “world”’ (2006: 236). 
 
Dewey argued more specifically that democratic practice is itself pedagogical in so far as – 
like any genuine experience – it renders a person ‘more sensitive and responsive to certain 
conditions, and relatively immune to those things about him that would have been stimuli if 
he had made another choice’ (Dewey 1938: 37).21 Democratic education is therefore 
oriented not towards the accomplishment of predetermined learning objectives or mastery of 
predefined bodies of knowledge, but rather towards the ‘directed development of the 
                                                          
20
 This argument draws in part on Peter Mayo’s (2002) reading of Gramsic’s theory of hegemony as a 
fundamentally pedagogical project, as well as on theories of ‘public pedagogy’ (Giroux xxxx; Sandlin 
et al. 2011). 
 
21
 In his ‘Essay on liberation’, Marcuse (1967) makes a similar argument in that a ‘new sensibility’ 
might be developed through engaging in practices that effect ‘a break with the familiar, the routine 
ways of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may become receptive to 
the potential forms of a non-aggressive, non-exploitative world’. 
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possibilities inherent in ordinary experience’ (Dewey 1938: 89).
22
 And, in Dewey’s terms, ‘the 
end of democracy is a radical end. For it is an end that has not been adequately realized in 
any country at any time. It is radical because it requires great change in existing social 
institutions, economic, legal, and cultural’ (Dewey 1939). 
 
For this reason, struggles for autonomy and democratic social change value the creation of 
alternative ‘institutions of knowledge, of creation, of care, of invention and of education that 
are autonomous from capital’, and in which such types of experience may be possible (Day 
2005; Federici 2011; Graeber 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Such projects have also played an 
important role in articulating ‘an expanded concept of struggle, one that emphasizes the 
importance of everyday practices and of contests over meaning in the reproduction and 
transformation of hegemonic power relations’ (Cote et al. 2007: 5). In recent years, there has 
been a pedagogical turn in European activist politics as social movements in the global 
North incorporate popular-education techniques of self-education, collective reflexivity and 
the collaborative systematisation of knowledge in more regular ways (Motta 2011; Scandrett 
2010; Scathach 2012). However, while popular education can facilitate conscientisation, it 
does not always enable the robust theorisation of the ontological, affective or social 
foundations of new knowledge and practices. Indeed, in certain senses, this is not its 
purpose. Nor do we find this depth of understanding in Theodor Adorno’s somewhat abstract 
suggestion that while we cannot rid society of brutality, once we understand the 
mechanisms, ‘education and enlightenment can still manage a little something’ to minimise 
its development and legitimation (1967: 10).23 There is an educational need today, in 
                                                          
22
 Another way of explaining this is through Kompridis’s distinction between defining politics as the ‘art 
of possibilities’, on the one hand, and as ‘the art of disclosing possibilities’, on the other (2011: 256). 
The first limits itself to the horizons of extant and thinkable possibilities, whereas the latter seeks to 
transgress and extend them. 
 
23
 Adorno also understood the pedagogical nature of desire, but mindful of the role that schools 
played in cultivating fascist subjectivities during his lifetime he remained wary of projects of subject 
transformation. Nevertheless, he asserted that encouraging independent critical thinking and empathy 
was the only real defence against an insurgent “barbarism [which] is inscribed within the principle of 
civilization” (Adorno, 1967: 1). For “if anything can help against coldness as the condition for disaster”, 
he wrote, “then it is the insight into the conditions that determine it and the attempt to combat those 
conditions, initially in the domain of the individual” (1967: 9). Here, Adorno parts company with Bloch, 
Fromm and Marcuse, all of whom suggested that education was a corrective for the distortions of 
human nature which were wrought by capitalist logic and authoritarian relationships. For Adorno, the 
problem was grimmer: Auschwitz, the Armenian genocide and the dropping of atomic bombs were not 
anomalous events that could be attributed to miseducation. Rather, he argued they were “expressions 
of an extremely powerful societal tendency” towards dehumanization that is an ever-present 
potentiality within human beings, emboldened under some conditions and more repressed in others. 
Dominant pedagogical practices did not make people “cold” or unable to love others, but they 
reinforced and educated these affective conditions. Adorno’s response was not, however, to advocate 
a counter-pedagogy of love. He understood on the one hand that it would be an authoritarian irony to 
demand that people love, and on the other that there was little mileage in appealing liberally to 
“eternal values, at which the very people who are prone to commit such atrocities would merely shrug 
their shoulders”. But a critical education that problematised these tendencies in a dialectical way 
could, he thought, illuminate ‘the conditions that determine [emotional coldness] and the attempt to 
combat those conditions, initially in the domain of the individual’, and that this might in some way help 
‘bring coldness to the consciousness of itself’ (Adorno, 1967: 9; Lewis, 2006a, 2006b). This footnote 
is excerpted from Amsler (2011).  
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projects for radical democracy and post-capitalist futures, that neither popular education nor 
critical pedagogy can fulfil. 
 
An alternative to both pragmatic knowledge production and elite theorisation suggests that 
education, in the broadest and deepest sense, is one of our most important means for 
pursuing individual and collective projects of humanisation and flourishing; that it is one of 
our richest sites of philosophical and theoretical insight into these projects, and that it is a 
valuable and powerful site of intellectual and political resistance and transformation.24 It is 
not particularly radical to argue that we need types of education which help people achieve 
states of genuine political and intellectual autonomy, satisfy the need for flourishing social 
collectivities, foster egalitarian relations of economic organisation, encourage creative 
experimentation, and cultivate a general reflexivity of self and hospitality to otherness. In Left 
politics, education is also called upon to respond to some more specific problems and 
desires: to either take control of or disinvest from institutions that are not democratically 
accountable; to challenge forms of power that operate through people’s desires to be 
recognised, moral and useful; to challenge deterministic ontologies (what Fielding and Moss 
[2011] call the ‘dictatorship of no alternatives’) which stunt both critique and the radical 
imagination; to cultivate ‘negative capabilities’ that allow people to engage critically and 
openly with difference and difficulty; and to create critical-practical knowledge that is not 
detached from everyday life and which empowers human efficacy in social affairs. What 
does such work look like here now, in circumstances where critiques of society orbit around 
the increasing damages of neoliberal rationality and the limits of ‘post-democratic’ institutions 
– including, in some cases, educational?  
For inspiration, I would like to draw on some work being done by socially engaged 
educators, artists and activists in the UK, which deals directly with the ontological, 
epistemological, affective and material conditions of learning new ways of thinking, feeling, 
doing and being. One environmental activist whom I interviewed refers to this as the 
‘beautiful stuff behind the scenes’, and it has striking resonances with critical-theoretical 
concepts of reflective receptivity, subjective transformation, agency and possibility. I am 
speaking here of practices that can tap into the ‘affectual, the experiential, the cultural and 
the spiritual’ dimensions of experience in order to transform ‘the way that knowledge is 
created away from its representation in the figure of the abstracted and disembodied 
intellectual to a process of embodied (in the community and in the self) collective 
construction that is inseparable from action’ (Motta 2012).  
Unfortunately, these concerns are often marginalised in critical and radical theory. And yet, 
this very type of work is playing a significant role in helping people to ‘facilitate the 
enlargement of meaning and possibility’, and ultimately to either mediates transformative 
experience or makes transformative action possible (Kompridis 2006: 136). Indeed, as Anna 
Marie Smith argues,  
                                                          
24
 Education-in-its-broadest sense’ is a term borrowed from Michael Fielding and Peter Moss (2011). 
It bears similarities to Continental notions of ‘social pedagogy’ which see education as ‘fostering and 
supporting the general well-being and development of children and young people, and their ability to 
interact effectively with their environment and to live a good life’ (46). This is contrasted to education-
in-its-narrower sense, which is about schooling, formal learning, and mainly compartmentalised 
cognitive subjects (47). 
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‘radical democratic pluralist theory must provide the tools that would allow democratic 
activists who are engaged in the struggles against capitalist exploitation, sexism, 
racism and homophobia to map out the context of those struggles, namely the given 
configurations of power relations. We should, however, acknowledge the fact that 
democratic activists are already engaged in this important work; radical democratic 
theory needs to learn from their activism and to keep pace with their valuable 
innovations. In any event, radical democratic pluralist theory cannot stop short with a 
model based on “scientific” abstractions, however elegant they may be. What is 
needed is a theory of social structures and identity formation that explores the 
complex ways in which the multiple forms of exploitation and oppression intersect, 
overlap, combine together, shape one another and contradict one another’ (Smith 
1998: 40).  
In the spirit of advancing this project, I would like to offer a few illustrations of how 
pedagogies of invention, emergence and becoming (Dewey 2005); encounter and discomfort 
(Boler 1999, 2004; Boler and Zembylas 2003); and sociality and community (hooks 2003); 
and of hope (Bloch 1991; Freire 2000; Giroux 2002) inform the development of prefigurative, 
radical-democratic practices in the areas of popular arts, education and cultural activism in 
the UK. I will then suggest some of the problems and limitations of this work, and consider 
how we might evaluate its significance for the renewal of radical democratic politics in 
everyday life.  
Pedagogies of invention, emergence and becoming 
The idea of democracy implies both change and improvement; it is normative and utopian in 
that its only real justification is that it promises the possibility of open and alternative futures 
which are not fixed in tradition, lines of authority, laws and etc. It is based on a faith that 
existing arrangements, values, boundaries and etc. can be otherwise given the will of people 
to make them so. Democracy is in this sense the only political arrangement that is 
commensurate with the ontological character of possibility itself, as it ‘cannot be fixed’ and is 
not an object but a ‘function of the vocabulary in which it is expressed’ (255). Kompridis thus 
redefines democratic politics not as the ‘art of possibility’ but as the ‘art of disclosing 
possibilities’ (2006: 256). 
When cultural workers attempt to explain the social problems to which they are responding, 
they often speak of the foreclosure of existing institutions and conditions for possibilities, 
reducing pluralistic ways of being and obscuring critical ways of seeing; the ‘hardening’ of 
classrooms, the fragmenting of immigrant communities. In some situations the forces of 
foreclosure, despair and disempowerment are so great that the project of ‘opening’ space is 
prioritised. If we are so concerned with the foreclosure of spaces for being and becoming 
otherwise, it makes sense to attend to how people learn to invent or create (subjectivities, 
questions, solutions to problems, art, relationships, spaces, imaginaries, theories), to 
emerge. The question is, what sort of practices have the actual potential to expand an 
individual’s existing horizons of intelligibility and possibility, and more significantly to shatter 
the wider ‘dictatorship of no alternatives’ to dominant political and economic structures? Can 
we teach or learn ‘becoming’? 
I asked Gary, a traditional storyteller, a similar question. Interestingly, he could not initially 
make sense of it. He thought for for a while, and then asked: ‘but isn’t all education 
transformative?’ This question highlights the basic fact that the meaning of ‘education’ is not 
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self evident, and that some processes of learning are, as Dewey argued, ‘mis-educative’. 
Here, however, I am interested in the education that refers only to experiences of learning 
and discovery which open possibilities for further experiences of learning and discovery 
(1938: 27). Dewey also distinguishes between two types of experience: those which are 
immediate experiences (for example, of pleasure or displeasure) and those which are 
longer-term and which ‘live on’ in other experiences. As the effects of experience are not 
self-evident in either case, the ‘central problem of an education based upon experience is to 
select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent 
experiences’ (28).  
Pedagogies of becoming therefore tend to prioritise two types of work: creative and aesthetic 
work (‘art’, in the broad sense), and dialogical and relational work (‘conversation’, in the 
broad sense). Both of these aim to create spaces, times and opportunities for openness, on 
the one hand, and possibilities for people to engage in more open-ended, imaginative and 
non-essentialist ways of learning and being together, on the other.  
Beth teaches basic language skills to refugees and children of refugees in South London; 
she is also concerned with their political rights and welfare. She describes why the product 
of communication, which is the explicit subject matter, is less important than the process of 
learning and gaining confidence in new forms of what she calls ‘real’ dialogue, where people 
are talking and listening to each other in ways that are not pre-emptive or predetermined, 
and which can be expanded into other areas of life.25 You can only ‘see yourself changing’, 
Beth claims, when people shift from their habitual ways of talking about issues with each 
other to ‘real dialogue’ – ‘and that’, she said, ‘is where the attempt to close down thought, the 
attempt to close down ideas, opinions, is counteracted. I think the sort of reading in a 
collective voice…other ideas come from that.’  
What Beth describes easily qualifies as a practice that Kompridis refers to as ‘intimate 
critique’,  
‘a practice of critical dialogue that aims to preserve and renew trust, and to facilitate a 
commitment to ongoing processes of cooperative problem solving [...] based on the 
recognition and performative acknowledgement that we are the facilitators and 
guarantors of one another’s fragile freedom...to criticize and innovate...’ (2006: 262). 
Other artists try more deliberately to create work which opens space for experiences that 
foster experience, both subjective and social. A major objective of such relational work is to 
‘create the capacity to recognize, through questioning and listening, to make the 
                                                          
25
 Attention to how work done in discrete educational spaces connects to other parts of life, however, 
is important. According to Dewey, ‘as an individual passes from one situation to another, his world, his 
environment, expands or contracts. He does not find himself living in another world but in a different 
part or aspect of one and the same world. What he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in 
one situation becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the situations 
which follow. The process goes on as long as life and learning continue. Otherwise the course of 
experience is disorderly, since the individual factor that enters into making an experience is split. A 
divided world, a world whose parts and aspects do not hang together, is at once a sign and a cause of 
a divided personality. When the splitting-up reaches a certain point we call the person insane. A fully 
integrated personality, on the other hand, exists only when successive experiences are integrated 
with one another. It can be built up only as a world of related objects is constructed’ (Dewey 1938: 
44). 
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preparations for a participant – and themselves – to see a disclosure of something not 
already known, which was collectively created, and not already fixed’ (Heim 2003: 191).26 As 
David reflects, these were most effective when they integrated intellectual or cognitive with 
affective and emotional work. One of his most powerful exhibitions was: 
‘not just about ‘information’ transfer, [but about] hearing about, seeing me walking 
through a landscape, [for example] walking from Goethe’s summer house in Weimar 
to Buchenvald, the concentration camp…counting the number of steps between 
those places, reading testimony on the way, from civilisation to barbarism, in a short 
afternoon walk. […] And then they had the experience with the other people who’d 
been through that experience—on [a] boat [ride which was part of the exhibition]. And 
then we had feedback days afterwards when people from the different events could 
come together and people could talk to me, or they’d write to me separately and I’d 
email or we’d exchange or we’d meet up, and so, a multitude of dialogues came out 
of those events.’ 
In another context, Jill, who is an environmental activist, popular educator and teacher of art 
teachers, explained the significance of creativity for radical democratic possibilities. ‘Art can 
act in a very slow and sometimes ineffable way’, she said, ‘a way that can’t be predicted or 
described’. Its ineffability is understood to stem from the affective logic of autonomous 
creative practice. Because affective influence cannot be easily intentional or controlled, ‘art 
is not synonymous with legislative force, it cannot oblige us to act, its register is affective, not 
prescriptive’ (Meskimmon 2011: 8, cited in Addison 2012: 365). It ‘enters from without (from 
others, the environment) and does things to us’, and at the same time ‘is a force through 
which we impact others: our presence, energies and actions attract attention and elicit 
responses, resulting in movements oriented towards or away from us’ (Addison 2012: 370).27 
Because the process of making art does not inherently ‘have quantifiable change attached to 
it’, creating space for this type of work is regarded as one way of creating a limited ‘outside’ 
to the dominant logics of exchange value, hierarchy and quantifiable targets of activity which 
characterise neoliberal and managerial forms of control.28  
                                                          
26
 Following Gadamer, we may understand conversation as the primary work of art (Heim 2003: 184). 
27
 ‘Despite the privileging of cognitive development in education, humans are evidently not merely 
cognitive beings. Rather we are embodied creatures, beings who feel, think and act through the body 
on other bodies and are in turn affected’ (Addison 2012: 375). 
28
 Although it is ‘one of the most fundamental and most necessary of all concepts of social and 
political theory’, disclosive critique is a nebulous phenomenon (Kompridis 2006: 109). Kompridis 
makes very clear that disclosure of possibility is not a ‘capacity that can be “administered”’; that there 
is ‘no empirical methodology for learning how to disclose a world’; that it cannot be ‘transmitted as 
such technologies and skills are daily transmitted in art schools, music schools, and the like’; ‘not a 
kind of knowledge, or even a kind of doing, that is objectifiable and formalizable’ (Kompridis 2006: 
108; see also 117); not ‘a technique, a distinctive way of using language over which we can dispose 
at will, something that can be “administered”’, and not always linguistic (222); not ‘implicit, rule-
governed knowledge that can be reconstructed the way that rule-governed use of language can be 
reconstructed’ (108–9); not a form of procedural argumentation (118) or rhetorical strategy (119, 221); 
above all not a tool (221); possibility is ‘not something whose conditions of possibility...we can fully 
and explicitly state; it is not something that can be empirically surveyed and demarcated’ (198); 
decentring is neither a skill nor form of mastery, and is generally resisted because it hurts (214) -- and 
thus Habermas’s argument that ‘the enterprises of art and literature...administer world-disclosing 
capacities’ (cited in Kompridis 2006: 108) is ‘nothing more than a stab in the dark’. It is thus not 
accessible or verifiable through sociological hypotheses and procedures. But this does not mean that 
it cannot be a form of philosophical argument, if this is defined more broadly (119). Indeed it must be, 
if the capacity to begin a new is fundamental for democracy and any sort of human agency (197). 
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Cultural workers have other ways of facilitating such disclosures. Storytelling, for example, 
offers a medium through which people can liberate their imagination and desire, and telling 
stories can be ‘a way of reconstructing reality, and sometimes, it also enables the healing of 
deep wounds’ (Motta 2011). The radical potential of this, in situations where people are 
either repressed in states of domination or paralysed by experiences of mystification and 
disempowerment, is that ‘it breaks across your pattern of feelings. It opens up the possibility 
of new feelings. It opens up the possibility of…you know, most fairy tales have very 
optimistic outcomes. […] [Y]ou have a sense that achievement is possible.’ As Peggy 
reflected,  
 
‘anything can happen in the story. You don’t have any prejudice about what might 
happen because it could be completely different; whereas if you are thinking about a 
person, you already have a prejudice against that person. In a story, magical things 
can happen. Somebody can change into a frog. You know that’s what happens in a 
story. So you are not even necessarily surprised by it. You are more open.’ 
 
The importance of disrupting habituated patterns of feeling, thinking and being for opening 
spaces of becoming otherwise also lies at the heart of forum theatre and other participatory 
performances. As Adam said, ‘when people get off their chairs and sort of break the mould 
of how we are, physically, I think it opens up all kinds of things in your body and your 
memories and in your – well, everything. The whole gamut, your whole being, whole body 
subjectness’.  
 
These micro, or localised possibility-enabling practices should not be dismissed, as they 
have been in the past, as cultural ‘pseudo-politics’ which reproduce relations of social 
domination by pretending to autonomy when they are always-already co-opted, on the one 
hand, or claiming social relevance when they are deeply detached from everyday life and 
political possibility, on the other. The concern, from Adorno to Habermas, has been that 
autonomous existence is either impossible or traded off in exchange for self-imposed 
irrelevance, despite Adorno’s rescuing of the revolutionary potential of art as a form of 
negative dialectics (Melaney 1997).29 The argument is that 
 
‘when released from demands for justification internal to proper everyday practices, 
art and literature can go about creating “autonomous” worlds of meaning that release 
subjects from their ordinary routines, and from everyday modes of perception and 
action: validity based speech and action, speech based on reason, goes on holiday’ 
(Kompridis 2006: 107).  
My argument, however, is not only that the practices described abive are embedded in 
everyday life, but also that it is a philosophical fallacy to presume we could ever really be 
outside the problems of ‘the real world’. Nor should these practices be disregarded as 
superficial exercises in affirmative futurity, if it is indeed the case that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Note that the agency he notes is a ‘radically noninstrumental’ one (203), just as disclosure is a non-
instrumental and noninstrumentalizable activity that is fundamentally different from propaganda (221). 
29
 ‘Works of art were purposeful because they were dynamic fatalities wherein all individual moments 
exist for the purpose of fulfilling the moments or redeeming them negatively. Works were purposeless 
because they fall outside the means-end relation governing the empirical world’ (Adorno in Melaney 
1997: 42). 
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‘the democratic future that we’re after is actually a future that we will only be able to 
make by opening the present differently. I think that many of us experience the 
present as terribly closed—not just closed because certain options have been 
foreclosed, but also closed because of certain stoppages in progressive history. I 
think the opening that we have to cultivate is a kind of affective and intellectual 
opening to political possibility that would help us read the present differently.' (Brown 
2006: 41).  
 
As a long line of critical theorists has argued, such ‘thinking from a new stance is essential to 
the democratic form of life’ (Kompridis 2006: 262). Making room for and being answerable to 
‘the call of an other’ means that we are ‘facilitating its voicing, letting it become a voice that 
we did not allow ourselves to hear before’ and consider doing things that did not occur 
(Kompridis 2006: 262).  
 
In order to do this, we must allow ourselves to be decentred. But we are not ‘naturally’ 
receptive to receptivity, or hospitable to critique, or confident in creativity; even less so in 
conditions of the capitalist everyday (Kompridis 2006: 257).30 It is thus more comfortable to 
work in homogenous groups which, for whatever reason, already value and cultivate these 
practices and sensibilities. As Beth pointed out, even in the microcosmic world of a diverse 
language classroom, genuine dialogue does not emerge organically or easily, or sometimes 
at all. Opportunities for its emergence must be facilitated, organised and held. ‘Because of 
power dynamics in the classroom’, she remarked, ‘trying to create a democratic space 
depends on a huge range of participatory tools and techniques’, and is a demanding, 
laborious and often frustrating type of work.  Similarly, we know that ‘[m]aking and looking at 
works of art is potentially a transformative event through which an engagement with alterity 
(the other) motivates us to act differently, whether that difference is cognitive, affective or 
cognitive (relating to acts of will or, in contemporary sociological terms, agency) in its effects’ 
(Addison 2012: 365). But as one artist points out, conversations about art can also ‘reinforce 
prefigured views’, particularly where they are disembedded from everyday life and 
meaningful relationships.  
 
The question of what accounts for the difference between possibility-enabling and possibility-
foreclosing, or transformative and reproductive experiences, thus lies at the heart of the 
problem of radical democracy. If we embrace such pedagogies of becoming, we therefore 
also need to simultaneously develop pedagogies of encounter and, in many cases, 
discomfort.  
Pedagogies of encounter and discomfort  
To re-imagine our own individual and collective limits of understanding and possibility – what 
Paulo Freire called our ‘limit situations’ – requires learning to experience troublesome 
knowledge and uncomfortable encounters with otherness and critique ‘not [as] the 
impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibility 
                                                          
30
 Kompridis defines this as ‘an everyday whose rhythms of work and consumption are dictated by the 
imperatives of money and power, actively erase the presence of the extraordinary within the ordinary, 
displacing it from the everyday, turning it contrary to the everyday, and fixedly identifying the everyday 
with sobriety, joyless sacrifice, and boredom’ (2006: 114–15). 
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begin’, and not as a ‘frontier which separates being from nothingness, but the frontier which 
separates being from being more’ (Vieria Pinto in Freire 2000: 99).  
 
Critical theory has tended to begin from the position that this sensibility is a necessary 
precondition for critique and transformative practice. Megan Boler, who has spent more than 
a decade developing a theory of ‘pedagogies of discomfort’, begins from a different place by 
asking ‘what we – educators and students – stand to gain by engaging in the discomforting 
process of questioning cherished beliefs and assumptions?’ (1999: 176) Her answer is that 
in doing so, we learn how our emotional investments in certain knowledges, practices, ways 
of knowing, disciplines, power structures and identities have been ‘insidiously woven in the 
everyday fabric of common sense’. This is not about feeling good. The experience of being 
decentred is ‘genuinely uncomfortable, unsettling, which is why, understandably, it is 
resisted’ (Kompridis 2006: 214). Boler’s understanding of pedagogy is thus not simply a 
theory of education, but one of the ‘interrelationships of how we see’ the word, ‘as well as 
[of] the emotional selectivity that shapes what and how we see’ (1999: 182). It also implies a 
materialist analysis of knowledge, as a ‘pedagogy of discomfort is about bodies, about 
particulars, about the “real” material of the world we live in’ because ‘beliefs are “embodied 
habits”, dispositions to act in a certain way in a given context’ (Boler 1999: 196).  
 
bell hooks has also raised the point that ‘it is fashionable these days, when “difference” is a 
hot topic in progressive circles, to talk about “hybridity” and “border crossing”, but we often 
have no concrete examples of individuals who actually occupy different locations within 
structures, sharing ideas with one another, mapping out terrains of commonality, connection 
and shared concern with teaching practices’ (hooks 1993: 124). The question therefore 
arises: what sorts of practices have the potential to make us more receptive to discomfort as 
a critical emotion, and to strengthen our capabilities to engage critically and generously in 
encounters with difference, ambiguity and unfamiliarity? Can we teach or learn to be both 
radically open and autonomously discerning? 
 
Again, the salience of this question for radical-democratic politics is clarified by cultural 
workers’ reflections on the lengths they go to in order to create conditions in which such 
learning is possible, as well as on the limitations and resistances to this that they encounter 
in their own practice. There is often a fraught tension between the aim to disrupt common 
sense, cherished truths and comfort zones, on the one hand, and to create experiences 
which are possibility-enabling, on the other. This is particularly difficult to negotiate in 
situations where there are high levels of individualisation and social fragmentation, precisely 
because this condition plays a major role in the cultures of fear that cultivate conservatism. 
One popular educator working in a Palestinian neighbourhood explained how simply striking 
up ordinary conversations with people whom we do not already know or with whom we are in 
conflict can be a radical intervention as it problematises rigid and bureaucratic roles and 
sensibilities, and challenges the compartmentalisation of people and our emotions. 
This matters because there are shrinking few possibilities for people to engage in critical 
thought or practice together, or what Alan referred to as ‘constructive’ or ‘creative’ conflict. In 
our society, he suggests, ‘there is a feeling that conflict is bad and that ‘what we need to do 
is all row the same way and…read off the same hymn book and just need to make tweaks’. 
Returning to the theories of radical democracy, we can see the profoundly anti-democratic 
implications of this position. For Dewey,  
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‘a genuinely democratic faith in peace is faith in the possibility of conducting disputes, 
controversies and conflicts as cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn 
by giving the other a chance to express itself, instead of having one party conquer by 
forceful suppression of the other –a suppression which is none the less one of 
violence when it takes place by psychological means of ridicule, abuse, intimidation, 
instead of by overt imprisonment or in concentration camps. To cooperate by giving 
differences a chance to show themselves because of the belief that the expression of 
difference is not only a right of the other persons but is a means of enriching one's 
own life-experience, is inherent in the democratic personal way of life’ (Dewey 1938: 
232). 
Adam, a popular educator who practices forum theatre with community groups, believes that 
constructive or creative conflict is ‘the basis for any democracy’, and, as he feels it is 
‘probably what has been stripped away from our lives’, that is an important site for 
educational work. He assumes that people are naturally cooperative, but have few 
opportunities to be in ‘physical spaces where people are able to come together and 
exchange ideas, feel respected and feel that there are possibilities out there other than just 
staying on a track’. Such spaces, however, must not mimic habitual attempts to break down, 
erase or assimilate difference, or to garner consensus, but rather to work with and through 
difference in order to create something new. This means facilitating ‘respectful but perhaps 
really intense debates about [in his work] class, race, privilege, popular education, direct 
action’, with the challenge being to create ‘forms and spaces where that can happen 
respectfully but not with the edges knocked off, not where everything becomes so polite that 
you’re not saying what you actually need to say or want to say’. Constructive conflict, he 
argues, is precisely what ‘generates ideas, generates energy that goes off in directions that 
you hadn’t really anticipated’; it is also ‘where the energy to do stuff emerges out of’; it is 
what enables the pursuit of ‘unfinished’ democratic practice. ‘We should not be 
disappointed’, he said, ‘if kumbaya is not going to be sung at the end’. The point is to ask 
why. ‘What does this do to us now as a group? How do we reorganise, how do we 
accommodate for this position, this feeling?’ His interest is therefore in ‘how people make 
spaces to come together, to exchange…and what are the barriers to that happening, and the 
limits’.  
 
Like other popular educators and activists, Adam deploys a range of ‘participatory tools and 
techniques’ towards this end. In particular, he is interested in types of performance which are 
‘stripped back to just using interaction and using our bodies to surface things that maybe we 
hadn’t even realised were there’, and exploring ‘the process of using our bodies to create, to 
express, and then [asking] how those expressions change collectively’. He illustrated the 
richness of such processes by describing how a single gesture could become ‘a source of 
debate and interaction’ as people interpret what it means and could mean together. Another 
popular educator similarly suggested that theatre is a particularly productive medium of 
encounter because it is so multidimensional – affective, cultural, psychological, embodied, 
physical and intellectual, mirroring the multidimensionality of power itself. For La Máscara, a 
Colombian feminist theater and popular education group, this work happens in spaces that 
‘facilitate free play within a space that values people’s life experience, diversity and 
expressions and which communities have the time and space to reflect upon their realities 
and experiment with their transformation’ within the context of their everyday lives (Motta 
2011). Such activities can ‘make people take risks, but in gentle ways where they decide the 
level of risk they want to take. So these processes are valuable in and of themselves’ (Greg 
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2012). 
 
The potentially transformative power of non-diremptive risk was also asserted by Greg, who 
uses storytelling as a means of exploring problems of prejudice and violence with children. 
Storytelling, he argues, offers ways of bridging difference, often ‘leaping over language’ to 
the more universal patterns and themes of knowledge, experience, power and struggle 
within the stories themselves. When discussing children’s relationships, for example, you 
can say, ‘do you remember the rat and the cat? Do you think the rat could have done 
something different in those circumstances?’ […] And then they can come up with solutions 
about the cat and the rat, but they’re not going to come up with solutions about these two 
kinds who are in total conflict.’ Through these characters, however, such forms of storytelling 
can contribute to the cultivation of empathetic relationships.   
 
Sometimes creating spaces for constructive conflict can be ‘as basic as making sure 
everyone’s taken care of…to make sure people can get [to a meeting], that people’s 
expenses are paid, that people are listened to’, and that the spaces themselves are 
physically and emotionally safe. But building such spaces takes time. As Adam reflected, 
 
‘these are deeply mundane time-consuming processes that really require a lot of 
personal energy and a lot of mundane stuff like just being, getting food, making sure 
that children are cared for, having fun, making sure that people are healthy and…it’s 
really hard.’31 
 
Adam also regards subjective states such as humility and courage – things we can neither 
see nor account for, and which neither precede nor succeed states of openness – to be 
important factors in the real cultivation of these possibilities.  
 
‘Popular education can be this fancy, hexagonal post-it notes with different colours 
and methods for this, or it could just be dialogue and respectful, brave. […] I think so 
much is about humility and courage, actually. Humility is a huge thing for me. I’m not 
saying I’m always humble, but I think a kind of grounded, open humility is the bravest 
and best thing where you’re offering and open to offers at the same time. It can be 
very spiritual too, whatever that means to people as individuals.’  
 
Pedagogies of community, solidarity and resistance 
 
It would thus be unwise to conclude that pedagogies of and for radical democracy can be 
limited to pedagogies of becoming, discomfort and encounter, particularly if these are 
directed towards the individualised, rationalist subject of liberal democracy. In the first 
instance, it is impossible to really encounter difference, otherness and the radically new as 
an individual, both limited and protected by one’s own ordinary horizons of meaning and 
experience. It is reasonably easy to avoid being troubled or transformed on one’s own; new 
                                                          
31
 In art education as well, there is an alternative ‘economy of affect’ that ‘is in circulation within such 
environments. ‘These spaces’, he writes, ‘require the open attitude of the listener rather than the 
probing scrutiny of the diagnostician; they also require long and reciprocal knowledge of the people in 
the pedagogic relationship, an economy of mutual exchange more than accumulation’ (Addison 2012: 
xxx). 
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possibilities cannot emerge without at least ‘the presence of a plurality of local worlds and 
cultural practices’ (Kompridis 2006: 220, 229). Secondly, ‘dialogue cannot occur between 
those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming – between those 
who deny others the right to speak their world and those whose right to speak have been 
denied them’ (Freire 2000: 88). And finally, if struggles to create conditions of genuine 
dialogue and democratic governance in everyday life are to have any hope of succeeding, 
they must be grounded in strong affinities, friendships and solidarities which themselves 
have critical learning – about collective relationships and emotions as well as ideas and 
strategies – at the heart.  
 
Democratic politics thus involves the cultivation and nurturing of collective relations. This is 
particularly the case for any deep forms of democracy, as far as the task of producing critical 
knowledge is often undertaken on the margins of the acceptable and the desirable within 
institutions and everyday life, and can result in individualisation and isolation. To think and 
govern ourselves in new ways, we must learn to be otherwise. And yet, it is precisely 
individualised sensibilities and competitive practices that are being predominately learned, 
valued and institutionalised in post-democratic societies, and particularly in mainstream 
educational institutions, with one consequence being that ‘we have lots of information, but 
don’t really have many ideas. There’s a lot of collective wisdom that’s sort of bubbling under 
the surface’ (Adam 2012).  
 
Artist-activist Jim thus argues that working in radically democratic ways requires exercising a 
‘weak muscle’ in a society which expends huge energy and resources teaching people how 
to be individualised rather than collaborative. Relations of intelligibility and affinities must be 
forged through sustained and patient processes of learning that are recursive and rhizomatic 
rather than linear and bounded. But is a sensibility a muscle-like tool? How do you ‘exercise 
a muscle’ that is actually a way of being, or a condition of intelligibility? What cultural and 
pedagogical practices could close the distance between separated and often divided 
subjects, in a way that simultaneously expands the horizons of intelligibility and possibility for 
both?  
 
These are questions that Kompridis sought to answer through his new language of ‘freedom-
enlarging possibilities’ (2006:  57) and the ‘enlargement of logical space’? (105). For many 
cultural workers, such bridging work is accomplished in relatively simple ways. In formal 
education, for example, bell hooks has described strategies for sharing perspectives on a 
common theme in ways that ‘everyone’s voice can be heard, their presence recognized and 
valued’. By reading aloud short paragraphs that they have written, people ‘all have a chance 
to hear unique perspectives and we are all given an opportunity to pause and listen to one 
another. Just the physical experience of hearing, of listening intently, to each particular voice 
strengthens our capacity to learn together’ (hooks 1994: 186). In a similar vein, but in 
contexts of popular adult education, the act of representing and visualising other people’s 
experiences, arguments and representations of self – through gestures of performance, for 
example, or the construction of a piece of writing or work of art – offers an opportunity for 
‘multiple experiences to be all in the same room at the same time’ (Adam 2012). This is 
consistent with Kompridis’s argument that radical receptivity, or ‘hearing’ multiple voices, is 
one way of ‘keeping open...the logical space of possibility’ (2006: 204). The narrowing and 
silencing of voices, possibilities, ranges of experience, permissible things to think and say, 
attitudes and activities are all acts of contraction, because with openness in each of these 
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areas the realms of possible cognitions, experiences and ways of seeing are expanded. 
Simply by ‘fostering and preserving a plurality of cultural practices and a plurality of local 
worlds’ we can ‘resist totalizing practices, totalizing disclosures of the world that conceal 
their disclosedness’ (pp. 219-20).  
 
This is not synonymous with radical democracy, and just as well reflects the best of liberal 
pluralism or the worst of social cacophony. And yet, its significance as a condition for the 
possibility of democratic power is profound. For without such practices of collective listening 
and seeing, there can be few opportunities for self-governance or for resisting oppressive 
power. In one sense, ‘the ability of the oppressed to imagine the complete overthrow of their 
oppressors depends upon the circulation, radicalization and institutionalization of democratic 
discourse’ (Smith 1998: 7). As one environmental activist and popular educator argued,  
 
the government and [the corporation] know how to compartmentalise, or think they 
know how to compartmentalise, like – that’s what an activist looks like, that’s what an 
Asian community organiser looks like, this is what a trade union is like. But what they 
didn’t expect was for us all to speak with each other, and that’s where things become 
a bit scary for the powers that be. They can’t compartmentalise us and I thought that 
was incredibly powerful and possibly one of the biggest successes of our campaign.’ 
One memory in particular left a powerful imprint upon his work. He remembered  
‘seeing a lady stood up in a workshop under the flight path in [her neighbourhood], 
which is really a marginalised community…and said something along the lines of, 
“I’ve never felt so valued in being able to make choices for myself and being able to 
connect the dots”. Basically, we’ve got a whole load of communities under different 
flight paths together in one room, and then the penny struck that actually, (a) they 
were not on their own, and (b) they’d all been lied to by [the airline companies]. It was 
just incredibly powerful stuff, what popular education can do on a real human level 
which then can make people feel more empowered to go and take more audacious 
action.’ 
Another educator recounted her experience of working with refugees who put on a public 
political performance to publicise their struggles in their city of residence. She had heard 
much of the rhetoric of ‘empowerment’ before. But 
‘when I sat and did the evaluation session…a couple weeks after the big ceremony 
happened, I just couldn’t believe what was coming out of people’s mouths. [They 
said] “I just felt I had this duty, I mean, I was compelled to take part because it was 
about my situation and I felt like I had to be there. And my voice needed to be heard 
and I pushed myself, and now I’ve pushed myself and I just feel like I want to do 
more, and…there’s so much more I want to say, and I felt like I was listened to…”.’  
Such experiences are noted because they are extraordinary. When asked to describe them, 
many cultural workers want to speak instead about how they survive the long stretches of 
mundane and invisible labour when nothing seems to be happening at all. The politics of 
time – to reflect; deliberate and agonise; build trust, understanding and confidence; and take 
ownership of a process – are critical here. For, ‘without the possibility of both deliberation 
and negotiation, and of the leisureliness that affords them, the conditions for democracy are 
literally eviscerated’ (Brown 2005: 8).  
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But time – in networked neoliberal societies of speed, in the frenzied temporalities of 
frontline activist politics, in the compressed labour processes of advanced capitalism, in the 
gendered divisions of labour in everyday life – is precisely what many people often cannot 
imagine having (Adams 2011). This insight is not lost on cultural workers, many of whom 
believe that pedagogies of becoming and of encounter cannot be effective, or may even be 
counterproductive, when engaged in short-term and institutionally-defined relationships. With 
all the radical intention in the world, such limitations do not allow people to ‘build a process 
that people would have ownership from, right from the beginning’, and that could challenge 
existing institutional forms (Adam 2012). As another popular educator reflected, ‘to have the 
group or participants really begin to take ownership of a space takes time, and it takes time 
for the trust to develop beyond some sort of superficial [thing]’ (Alice 2012). One educator 
even referred to temporally open relationships as an ‘evolutionary missing link’ – time ‘where 
people get to sit down with a weekend or a week or a month; with such individualised lives I 
think it could take forever, but to actually start thinking about things in a different way’ 
(Heather 2012).  
 
In other words, intellectual and political communities of opposition, resistance and alterity not 
only do not emerge by magic, but are often only made possible by going to considerable 
pains. They cannot be instrumentally generated through technical methods. For although it 
sometimes seems that we can use ‘quite simple techniques to build a movement’ (David), 
the effects of cultural practices are not determined by the practices themselves, which 
imbricate with and are contingent upon the conditions of their own possibility. As one 
educator pointed out, even the most basic methodology of popular education cannot be 
understood ‘as though it’s like this thing that can sort of stand on its own’. In her experience, 
it ‘works best when it is enmeshed in a particular movement or mobilisation...something 
that’s got a kind of other concrete reality to put into it. Because otherwise it can feel a bit … 
discombobulated’ (Ann 2012). As one educator remarked,  
 
‘that stage of people being conscious and speaking out and taking part and feeling 
like they’ve got, realising that they can participate and act, is just one step in the 
process, isn’t it? And actually, the forces that then you’ve got to try to deal with or 
times you’ve got to deal with to actually get the change you’re talking about, are 
enormous.’ 
 
Despite the limitations these experiences are regarded as transformative on several levels. 
First, they signal to a person that ‘your place in the world has changed’. Second, there is a 
subsequent realisation that ‘you have the ability to determine the world’ and ‘it’s not set in 
stone’. This leads, ideally, to a further imagination that ‘things aren’t what they seem to be’, 
but flexible and contingent. Ultimately, as one popular educator put it, ‘it’s in the aspect of 
being critical and that’s both self-reflection as well as realising that things aren’t, it’s almost 
as if the world has changed and therefore it’s seeing things as not what they used to be and 
therefore seeing that your place isn’t determined and you can actually determine our own 
life.’  
This intimates some grounding for a critical theory of and for the permanent revolution of 
everyday life. One of Kompridis’s primary objectives is to recover the significance of ‘the 
everyday’ as a space and time where transformative forms of rationality and cultural 
practices may be undertaken (2006: 38), and to challenge the belief that an ‘elitist contempt 
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for the everyday’ necessarily inheres in theories of crisis and disclosure.32 He argues that ‘if 
like [in] pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein one thinks of everyday practices as the 
primary sources of social intelligibility, one will naturally be very concerned about their 
openness to meaning and possibility, and their ongoing disfiguration by homogenizing and 
totalizing tendencies within them’ (2006: 74).It is precisely this concern, as well as the 
converse concern with the ongoing figuration of alternative everydays through de-
homogenizing and anti-essentialist practices, which underlies work in prefigurative forms of 
radical democracy. But the question remains: what – if anything – connects such 
pedagogical work in concrete terms to the renewal of radical democracy as a serious 
political project? 
Pedagogy of possibility – a radical, humble, utopian activity 
Thinking about radical-democratic life as incorporating multiple pedagogies of emergence 
and becoming; encounter and discomfort; and community and solidarity enables us to 
envision the types of learning that can help us to ‘risk “living at the edge of our skin,” where 
we find the greatest hope of revisioning ourselves’ (Boler 1999: 199). These are critically 
prefigurative pedagogies, which enable not only the critique and re-imagination of ourselves, 
others and society, but also foreground the affective and social labour upon which critical 
thought and practice rely, and create opportunities – or in some cases, needs – to defend 
the conditions that make such work meaningful and possible. Such pedagogies are vital if 
we aspire to make way for a kind of politics that valorises dissensus, infinite openness to 
difference, the decentring and ‘tearing away’ of epistemological and moral certainties, and 
the ongoing possibility of transformation in everyday life; which seeks to create new worlds 
that embody these principles by working within and using the resources of the existing one, 
with a particular attention to the micro-politics of space, time, language, the body and the 
emotions (Gibson-Graham 2006: xxvii). Pedagogies of possibility contribute to radical-
democratic politics by educating and creating space for the development of this sensibility. 
This is both a radical and a humble enterprise. 
This formulation admittedly runs a risk of possibilitarianism. It would be a grave mistake to 
presume that radical-democratic pedagogies necessarily contribute directly and productively 
to wider projects in radical democracy, or that their affirmative forms of ontology and politics 
coexist unproblematically with other negative forms of critique which are also regarded as 
important for radical-democratic theory (Holloway 2008). Critical theorists, educators and 
activists have made – and written extensively about – the mistake of loading 
disproportionate amounts of hope into education cultural work, whilst simultaneously 
explaining the its limits in relation to countervailing forces in the constitution of human 
subjectivities, the conditions of material circumstance, situations of institutional domination, 
the circulation of economic and symbolic power, the complexities of discourse, and the 
unaccountable influences of affect. Furthermore, as Inga Scathach (2011) argues, 
‘theory aside, the practice of popular education is a sticky affair. With an arsenal of 
techniques that includes theatre, storytelling and art, popular education carries the 
risk of being adopted by liberal arts organisations or the kind of social movements 
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 What is perhaps most interesting in Kompridis’s quotes from Mill, Emerson and Heidegger is that 
the critique of ‘mass culture’ is not specific to advanced industrial or postmodern society, or to critical 
theory proper (2006: 72). 
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that promote self-improvement over confrontational political action. As with any 
radical project, there exists the tendency to fascinate and attract lifestyle activists, 
and while this seems somewhat contradictory to its raison d’être, popular education 
is proving no exception. In spite of aiming itself squarely at politically marginalised 
communities, it is frequently co-opted as a tool for the left to wave around while only 
really putting it to any use within existing networks.’ 
At the same time, cultural activists are keen to point out that there is no justification for 
valorising the more visible actions and campaigns which often represent what many people 
think of as ‘radical politics’. As Beth argued, ‘real [society-level] change does not happen in 
campaigns’ any more than it happens in classrooms. For although it is important to wage 
tangible struggles that can be ‘laid down as a story of resistance’, she points out that many 
of these emerge from and are embedded in less tangible, often invisible, protracted 
‘drippings’ of work to criticalise and transform knowledge, subjectivity, affective sensibilities 
and social relationships. Struggles that are not grounded in such work, she argues, are 
simply ‘shovelling the problem to the future’ in its symptomatic form.  
 
Pedagogies of affect, discomfort and hope clearly have the potential to oppose and 
undermine capitalist rationality and strengthen radical democratic relationships, knowledge 
and practices. Such work is living proof, to use Marcuse’s words, of ‘the actuality or 
possibility of a qualitatively different historical practice which might destroy the existing 
institutional framework’. However, prefigurative pedagogies do not yet constitute what he 
referred to as transcendent projects, which represent and are accepted as ‘real possibilities 
open at the attained level of the material and intellectual culture’ (Marcuse 1964: xx). While 
they succeed spectacularly in demonstrating that alternatives are possible and may even 
create micro-democracies and ‘moments of excess’, they seem to also be demonstrating 
that these possibilities are created at considerable human cost, and are still also regarded by 
many people as undesirable or unfeasible in the everyday.33  
 
Marcuse explained the gap between the potentiality and realisation of a radical political 
project as a discrepancy between prevailing modes of subjectivity and the objective historical 
conditions of possibility for new ways of thinking and being emerge; in other words, another 
manifestation of the ‘vicious circle’ of needing to transform one in order to shift the other. I 
would like to suggest, however, that the theories and practices of prefigurative forms of 
radical democracy offer a path out of this vicious circle – a trap whose viciousness, it turns 
out, may be partly produced by its own strong theory of transformation which unwittingly 
reproduces dichotomies of immanence and transcendence by attempting to dialectically 
resolve them. This impasse of vision was, it seems to me, an honest reading of the historical 
conjuncture in which it was produced, rather than a failure of the radical imagination. Indeed, 
we might attend more to the parts of Marcuse’s work which elucidate his argument, perhaps 
prefiguring its own time, that ‘aesthetic education constituted a cultivation of the senses and 
that theory and education were essential components of transformative social change’, as 
well as attending to his hopes, and ultimately his disappointments, in the radical-democratic 
potential of the new social movements of the 1960s (Kellner 2002).  
 
                                                          
33
 ‘Moments of excess’ is a term coined by the Free Association to characterise the presence, in 
certain historical moments, of ‘a collective creativity that threatens to blow open the doors of their 
societies’ (Free Association 2004).  
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In this paper I have argued that: (1) radical democracy is an inherently pedagogical project; 
(2) the education of radical democracy is necessarily an affective as well as an intellectual 
and strategic activity; (3) prefigurative pedagogies are powerful antidotes to deterministic 
ontologies and hegemonic knowledge; (4) education is political but not synonymous with 
politics, and therefore should be understood as part of a larger assemblage of activities and 
practices; (5) neoliberal rationality is already being transformed in spaces of radical-
democratic education, activism and cultural work that exists beneath the radar of academic 
critical theory; and (6) we would benefit collectively from bringing critical theory, critical 
pedagogy and critical-political practice into conversation with one another, in the spirit of 
receptivity and critique. I will conclude with a few final thoughts about each of these points. 
 
Radical democracy is a pedagogical project. 
 
Radical democracy is an inherently pedagogical project, in two senses. One way of 
differentiating between radical democracy and other forms is to understand it as a way of life 
which is organised around the pursuit of processes of experience through which human 
beings can learn to continually expand our individual and collective horizons of possibility. 
Second, radical democracy is ‘radical’ both empirically and ethically as it describes a mode 
of politics which continually pushes the boundaries of possibility and opening itself to 
critique, difference and otherness – thus meaning that there is a frequent need to re-
examine the roots of our own intelligibility. This, I have argued, does not come ‘naturally’ to 
many people, and is therefore something that we must learn. Educating radical democracy 
requires pedagogies that address the ontological, affective and relational dimensions of 
democratic life. The pedagogical, however, is only one dimension of radical-democratic 
practice, which cannot exist independently of others – including acts of political and 
economic struggle. 
 
Prefigurative pedagogies can help us to resist and challenge determinism, fatalism 
and hopelessness, and produce alternatives to ‘strong’ theories of neoliberal 
hegemony. 
There is a fair amount of derision within critical philosophy of cultural practices which 
‘merely’ demonstrate the possibility of alternative ways of thinking and being in the world, or 
that open space for imagining a society that is not capitalist, patriarchal, racist, or in any 
other way violent and possibility-foreclosing. At the same time, there is ubiquitous 
recognition of a ‘crisis of hope’ – or in other words, a crisis of ontological politics – in 
contemporary society. As Kompridis argues, ‘since the availability of confidence and hope 
depends on discourses and practices that facilitate the enlargement of meaning and 
possibility, then, to the extent that critical theory forsakes its romantic self-understanding, it 
becomes literally deaf to its calling’ (2006: 279). In a period that is described as belonging to 
a history of ‘dark times’, it is theoretically and strategically important to critically account for 
the role that imaginaries and possibilities play in political action.  
Prefigurative politics can be a powerful form of immanent and intimate critique, and while it 
does not constitute radical democratic politics, it is an indispensible dimension of them. As 
Dewey put it,  
‘a sense of possibilities that are unrealized and that might be realized are, when they 
are put up in contrast with actual conditions, the most penetrating “criticism” of the 
33 
 
latter that can be made. It is by a sense of possibilities opening before us that we 
become aware of constrictions that hem us in and of burdens that oppress’ (Dewey 
2005: 360). 
We know that philosophy cannot ‘direct’ action; ‘at the very least, disclosure resists the 
foreclosure of possibility by disclosing ‘alternative possibilities’ and facilitating ‘with a little 
luck, the emergence of alternative practices’ (Kompridis 2006: 153). 
‘Cynicism thrives where the cultural space of possibility is fixed, where possibilities 
appear exhausted and resignation to the current order appears to be the only 
intelligible response. […] Philosophy cannot play the role of cultural superhero, but a 
modest world-disclosing role appropriate to its power of weak illumination is certainly 
not beyond its reach, especially when successful reaching means finding or 
defending some other way of going on not currently in view. […] Whatever the 
suggested alternative, it is not philosophy that determines its viability but those to 
whom it is addressed, those to whom it is offered for reflective consideration. 
Philosophy is just one more voice in this conversation…’ (Kompridis 2006, italics 
mine). 
The experiences of those working with movements illustrate the power of a living critique 
which speaks in another voice. Sara Motta (2011), reflecting on her popular education work 
with women in Colombia, suggests that it ‘would be unwise at this political conjuncture to 
close off our political imaginary, through a dismissal of its relevance, to our political context’. 
Rather, she argues, historical experience suggests that ‘it is urgent to cultivate an ethic of 
openness, dialogue, experimentation and exploration’ if we are to give any ‘hope to break 
out of the straightjackets of politics as normal’. If philosophy is one voice, pedagogy is 
another; there are others, which need to be assembled. 
In order to facilitate radical-democratic ways of life, those engaged in radical-
democratic education must also create and defend the economic, political and social 
conditions that make it possible.  
One of Marcuse’s strongest criticisms of the cultural revolutions of the mid-twentieth century 
was that while they succeeded in creating ‘autonomous’ spaces of critique and possibility, 
they had little impact on the systems of power they opposed, and that their subversive 
potential was bizarrely dependent on them being unable to influence dominant institutions at 
all (1973). His concerns echo a now much wider contemporary critique of prefigurative and 
‘autonomous’ politics, which is that their predominant strategies of embedded activism, 
institutional withdrawal and direct action create pressure-release valves for rather than viable 
alternatives to dominant systems of power, and capitalism in particular.  
The theoretical and practical work discussed in this paper, however, suggests an alternative 
perspective. It includes work undertaken by people seeking to become literate as they seek 
refuge in English cities; work for environmental justice in ‘front-line communities’ situated in 
the vicinity of incinerators, open cast mines and runways; holding behemoth oil corporations 
to account for the destruction of families and habitats in the Niger Delta; work to criticalise 
and democratise corporatized schools and universities. Within each of these contexts, there 
is some sense that working ‘autonomously’ from the dominant institutions and logics of 
thinking and practice is vital for transformative learning and action. However, this work is 
itself neither removed from everyday life nor ferreted away in the academy – and that which 
does fall into these traps is regarded as having an alienated character. 
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One implication of this is that the very act of doing critical cultural work often creates the 
need to struggle for its conditions of possibility – to prevent one’s students from being seized 
and deported in the middle of the night, to assert a person’s right to exist in public space, to 
protect land from contamination or foreclosure, to make sure people have bus fare to get to 
meetings, to resist the imposition of neoliberal rationalities onto ordinary practices in schools. 
Work ‘within’ existing institutions and everyday life, which is so often regarded as hopelessly 
compromised, in fact contains powerful potentials for disrupting those systems of power, so 
long as it is engaged at this level of intensity. As Smith argues,  
‘in a radical democratic society, there would be equal access not only to the material 
resources necessary for self-development, but also to meaningful participation in 
social, cultural, political and economic decision making. The radical democratization 
of existing state structures and social formations would require a profound 
redistribution of power and a complete dismantling of the structures that 
institutionalize inequality, including capitalist exploitation, sexism, homophobia and 
racism’ (1998).  
Any radically democratic theory of human possibilities cannot adequately inform educational 
or political practice in the abstract. As Nina Power (2008) has argued, we cannot simply 
argue that ‘all people are equally intelligent’ without accounting for the ways in which ‘the 
grossly divided and divisive reproduction of economic and cultural capital in all its 
entrenched and repetitious forms greets us at every turn‘.  
 
Critical theorists have been vexed by the dilemma of how to create new needs and desires, 
when everything in our social and cultural environment seems to steer us towards 
destructive ones. In a basic sense, the pursuit of a prefigurative politics opens up 
possibilities for such needs and desires to emerge out of necessity, in so far as we realise 
that we are beginning to think and do things that cannot be accommodated or tolerated 
within our existing base of resources, and that it is the latter which need to be transformed.34   
 
Pedagogies of possibility must be understood as parts of wider projects to dismantle 
neoliberalism and cultivate radical democracy. 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe once argued that ‘once human beings accept the 
legitimacy of the principle of equality in one sphere they will attempt to extend it to every 
other sphere of life’ (1990: 128). Unfortunately – and particularly in societies that not only 
enable but encourage people to compartmentalise themselves and their lives, and which 
people are deeply carved into unequal positions, spheres and geographical locations – this 
is not necessarily how egalitarian sensibility or democracy works in practice. In addition, 
many people will find that certain areas of their lives lend themselves to radical-democratic 
ways of thinking and being more readily than others. Those who are engaged in cultural 
work argue that they need to learn how to cross borders between theory and action, formal 
and informal, mass and elite. 
                                                          
34
 For a good example of this, see Judith Butler’s (2011) account of the significance of occupying 
public spaces: ‘as much as we must insist on there being material conditions for public assembly and 
public speech’, she wrote, ‘we have also to ask how it is that assembly and speech reconfigure the 
materiality of public space, and produce, or reproduce, the public character of that material 
environment’. 
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For some, it is clear that art, education, research and activism are interrelated sites for 
critical cultural work, and for the cultivation of radical democratic ways of life. But this does 
not mean that they are interchangeable; in fact, as one artist suggested, the fact that each is 
grounded in a different conception of truth means that each can make different sorts of 
contributions to the project on the whole. Take, for example, John’s theory of the relationship 
between art, activism and academic research. An ‘activist’ truth might emphasise the ‘now-
ness’ of a situation, rather than reflecting on the past or the distant future; it facilitates the 
formulation of an immediate and materialisable action. An ‘artistic’ truth, on the other hand, 
might have more flexible temporality, ‘sliding around’ between past and future, playing with 
the imagination. Finally, a ‘research’ truth would be more interested in verifiable fact; it is 
closer to the ‘common’ conception of truth. John argued that if these different conceptions of 
truth can be brought together in constructive conflict and meaningful dialogue to respond to 
a particular problematic, a ‘special quality’ emerges which ‘allows us to push through the 
boundaries of the possible’. Given the uncommonness of this in everyday life, those who are 
engaged in any of these practices need to devote adequate time and energy to learning – 
intellectually, affectively and relationally – how to engage with this ‘special quality’ as a 
possibility-enabling practice. 
Radical democracy is already here and now, and ever not-yet. 
It is perhaps a cliché of radical-democratic theory to say that politics is ‘here and now’. In 
one sense, this is obviously so: radical democratic politics are, at present, already being 
renewed. In a recent article on the Occupy movement, David Graeber argues that ‘when the 
history [of capitalism] is finally written…it's likely all of this tumult – beginning with the Arab 
Spring – will be remembered as the opening salvo in a wave of negotiations over the 
dissolution of the American Empire’. Speaking to socially engaged artists, educators and 
activists, however, one gets the impression that this salvo is just one of the more visible and 
sensational illustrations of the politics of possibility, which has been developing drip-by-drip 
since the 1970s, and apace since the 1990s. The excitement of Occupy has enchanted even 
the most critical of critical theorists (Amsler and Neary 2012). But at times, I think we are 
forgetting ourselves. These politics and potentialities are resurgent but not new. What is 
different is that we have been able to see them articulate into quasi-popular struggles in our 
own time and place. However, the recent emphasis within critical theory and radical-
democratic reporting on the ignition of the radical imagination, often pitted as an ‘alternative’ 
to the building of collective political struggle, draws our attention away not only from the 
multitudes of people who are engaged in local, radical-democratic projects with a lower ‘co-
efficient of visibility’ and less intellectual status, but also from the vital insights that these 
cultural workers and radical democrats have into the affective and pedagogical labour that is 
required to make such projects even marginally sustainable. 
The existence of these rich and diverse cultural practices within neoliberal society raises 
questions about the analytical and strategic usefulness of desiring to ‘dismantle’ 
neoliberalism. It is useful to remember that ‘neoliberalism’ is a convenient but perhaps 
overused term for an assemblage of economic, political, cultural, psychological and affective 
practices, or a form of power, or a political rationality, which is everywhere circulating but 
nowhere stabilised into a permanent thing. But by naming it as an objective system, ‘most 
theories of neoliberal rationality assume a certainty and sufficiency that blind us to the 
potential failures or faltering moments of this new governmental technology’ (Gibson–
Graham 2006: 4). While the abstract potential for radical democracy appears to be further 
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than ever away theoretically, capitalist power seems to have been pushed to its limits by 
prefigurative political practices, in part because it cannot easily assimilate them. As it seems 
that neoliberalism will not be dismantled prior to the radical democratisation of social, 
political and economic life, the cultivation of radical democracy in everyday life is thus a vital 
part of any project which aspires to contribute to the building of post-capitalist societies. This, 
however,  
‘cannot simply be put “out there” in the world with the hope that it will flourish. It 
needs to be sustained by the continual work of making and remaking a space for it to 
exist in the face of what threatens to undermine and destroy it. […] The self-
education and formation of ourselves as thinkers of theorized possibility are crucial to 
this practice’ (Gibson–Graham 2006: xxxvii). 
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